March 1968

NAMRATĀ
The Defence of Man

R. F. RATTRAY
Percipience

JOAN N. BURNETT
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Contemplative Life

ARTHUR L. HERMAN
An Essay Concerning Clive Bell: I

G. SRINIVASAN
Choice and Value

K. G. SAIYIDAIN
The Priority of Education

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Reincarnation in World Thought; *Psychoanalysis and Religion*; *Lear's Self-Discovery*; *Modern Aesthetics*; *A Child's Questions Answered*; *From the Flow of Life*; five books from Children's Book Trust

complete CONTENTS within

THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXIX - NO. 3

'Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

UNITY IS STRENGTH

Republic Day has come and gone. As we recall the celebrations, let us remember that in Unity lies our strength and it is only through Unity that we can achieve our cherished goal of peace and prosperity. As we reaffirm our pride and faith in our great country, let us all together, rededicate ourselves to the task ahead, to be

One Great Country, One Great People





dayp 67/449

THE ARYAN PATH

Editor: SOPHIA WADIA
Assistant Editor: Rameshchandra Sirkar

CONTRIBUTIONS

The Editor is responsible for unsigned contributions only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given

SUBSCRIPTIONS

THE ARYAN PATH is published monthly. Subscriptions are annual, but may begin with any desired month. Orders, accompanied by the appropriate remittance, should be sent to the Editorial and Business Office, Bombay, or the London Office

RATES

	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
INDIA	Re. 1.25	Rs. 12.00
EUROPE	1*s.* 9*d.*	18*s.* (or equivalent)
THE AMERICAS	50 cents	$5.00 (or equivalent)

OFFICES

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICE	Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines Bombay 1
LONDON OFFICE	62 Queen's Gardens, London W. 2

Available in the U.S.A. from Eastern News Distributors
155, West 15th Street, New York
N.Y. 10011, U.S.A.

THE ARYAN PATH: VOL. XXXIX · NO. 3

March 1968

NAMRATĀ	The Defence of Man	101
R. F. RATTRAY	Percipience	106
JOAN N. BURNETT	St. Thomas Aquinas and the Contemplative Life	109
...	In Memoriam: Dr. R. F. Rattray	114
ARTHUR L. HERMAN	An Essay Concerning Clive Bell: I	115
G. SRINIVASAN	Choice and Value	120
LILA RAY	Week-end (Poem)	124
G. NAGESWARA RAO	"To the Indians Who Died in Africa"	125
DOROTHY ELLIN FLAX	Tagore—Poet of Peace (Poem)	129
FRIEDRICH V. LUSTIG	Buddhism in the Union of Burma	130
	NEW BOOKS AND OLD	
N. A. NIKAM	Reincarnation in World Thought	134
	and reviews by	
	JOAN N. BURNETT, B. CH. CHABRA, K. GURU DUTT, MARCUS WARD, TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS, ELIZABETH CROSS, HILLA G. VAKEEL, AND K. E. PARTHASARATHY	135
K. G. SAIYIDAIN	The Priority of Education	142
VIJAYALAKSHMI PANDIT	Bhatia Endowment Lectures: 1967 Science and the Humanities: II	144
	CORRESPONDENCE	
E. V. HAYES	Hermitage	147
	ENDS AND SAYINGS	149

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXIX MARCH 1968 No. 3

The Defence of Man

To one man science is a sacred Goddess to whose service he is happy to devote his life; to another she is a cow who provides him with butter.

—JUSTUS VON LIEBIG

Men live not in a world of hard facts to which thoughts make no difference, but in a world of thoughts. If you change the moral, political and economic theories, on which he lives, you change the character of the world also.

—COLLINGWOOD

The needs of our Spiritual Nature can never be met by other than spiritual happiness.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

AS FAR BACK AS 1881 a great Indian Sage wrote:

Exact experimental science has nothing to do with morality, virtue, philanthropy — therefore can make no claim upon our help until it blends itself with metaphysics.

Much has happened since then in the realms of science and technology. Almost phenomenal progress has been achieved in every branch of scientific knowledge; yet the position on the basic issues of morality, virtue, and philanthropy has not altered.

A suffering and bewildered humanity is still groping in the dark, seeking for the meaning of human life, for a solution to the numerous and diverse problems it faces and the seriousness of which increases with every passing day.

The fundamental assumption of materialism is still the chief characteristic of science, and the scientist in his all-absorbing search for more and more knowledge remains aloof from and unconcerned about human affairs. Rightly has he been accused of living "apart," indifferent to human behaviour, accepting no responsibility for the social ills of our times.

And yet too many still confuse progress with the advance of science and the multiplication of mechanical inventions. They continue to look to science for guidance, blind to the fact that science itself cannot answer the question "Whither Science?" since it has no answer to the question, "Whither Man?" One is reminded of the conversation between Alice and the Cat in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*:

> "Cheshire Puss," Alice began, "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
>
> "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.

Where indeed do we *want* to get to? How many among the scientists or among laymen can answer the question, "Where do I want to get to?" And if we do not know where we want to go, have we not lost our way? Are we not walking aimlessly without rhyme or reason? Nay, more — are we not in danger of losing ourselves?

A few here and there are beginning to suspect that science is *not* the answer. Science is after all an abstraction in one sense; its power is wielded not by it, but by Man. It is Man and only Man who can give science a sense of direction. To do this the scientist must first orient himself. He must know where he wants to go and where he wants mankind to go. We fear very few among our scientists could answer the question Puss put to Alice!

There are, however, a few among our men of science who have awakened to their own responsibility. A most welcome and promising sign is the discussion taking place already in several scientific circles as to whether or not the scientist has the right to disclaim all moral and social responsibility for the misuse of scientific knowledge. Does not the very fact that he knows more increase his responsibility as an individual?

After all, when all is said and done, a scientist is a Man before he is a scientist and to be a Man is to be a morally responsible being. Divest Man of his individual moral responsibility and you have destroyed him. Man has ceased to be man and has become a mere animal.

The dehumanization of Man is the greatest threat, the most serious danger, we face today. The machine enthroned by man may now usurp altogether his place. This is no mere fancy or exaggeration, but an actual possibility. In fact, it is positively shocking to find that some are already speculating seriously on the development of computers so perfected and so skilful that they may altogether replace the human mind. Man need no longer think or initiate action: the computer will direct and tell him what he should do! This nightmare, formerly only a theme for the writer of science fiction, is now seriously discussed by intellectuals. The day is envisaged when computers will have become "guides, philosophers, and

friends" to human beings and the latter will willingly submit to being the passive instruments of a machine! This is alarming indeed, and it is high time that we recognized the error of equating scientific and technological progress with the progress of Man.

Let Man once renounce his most precious prerogative, the power to think and to choose, and his evolution will be at a standstill. More — since nothing can ever remain still, a downward movement will set in; retrogression will commence and Man will be ultimately annihilated. For that which makes man human is his capacity to think and to determine his own course of action.

Śaṅkarācārya, commenting on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* asks: "In what does the pre-eminence of man consist?" And having raised the question, a basic one, he gives the answer. Man's pre-eminence lies in his free-will and knowledge, *jñānakarmādhikāraḥ.*

Therefore the true philosopher views with growing concern the present trends in science which increase automation and mechanization and threaten to rob man of his humanity.

Verily, all that deprives man of his individual freedom, all that makes for regimentation and uniformity, all that dehumanizes man, is injurious to his progress and should be strongly opposed by all who have at heart the welfare and the evolution of humanity.

At this dark hour in the history of Man, when the individual is in danger of being submerged altogether, when he is threatened by ultimate extinction, it is more necessary than ever before to proclaim the true nature of Man. To the scientist and the social reformer, to the politician and the educationist, to the professional worker and to the manual labourer, to the artist and to the mechanic, we must cry out: "Pause and look within. Know yourself before it is too late!"

Again and again it has been said that the crisis the world is facing today is a crisis of character. If so it can be resolved only through a change of heart. The individual holds the key to the regeneration of humanity. But if we persist in abdicating our free will; if we continue to hold a mechanistic view of Nature and of Man; if we accept a behaviouristic philosophy of life, we shall hasten our downfall. We have adopted false values, material instead of spiritual, quantitative instead of qualitative. We must change our viewpoint and learn to see Man as more than his physical envelope.

Man is neither animal nor angel, but both, and much more than either, beast or *deva.* His position is unique. He alone is aware of his identity; he alone is a Thinker; he alone has the power of speech. "The Soul is everything," said Aristotle. But we have forgotten the Soul and allowed

the flesh to rule; and, as if that were not bad enough, we now want to be governed by the machine!

To those who fear that by giving Man his rights as an individual we sow the seeds of disunion and of anarchy, we must explain that this is so only when we overlook that the individual is part of a larger Self, that as individuals we are all united in the One Self. Only a materialistic concept of Man can result in anarchy. The Perennial Philosophy teaches non-separateness: unity in diversity. This is true of the Universe as of Man. The unity of Man lies in Being and his diversity in Becoming. We are one in Being; we are different in Becoming. Being is the power to become. In Being is the potency to unfold, to grow, to progress, and for Man this means self-effort, self-induced ways and means.

When it is said that "all men are created equal" it is really meant that in every man there is the same potentiality that is also in all men. And yet in the process of becoming every man is different from every other man. This is why the individual must be given full respect. "No man may be used only as a means by another. Each is himself an end," stated Kant.

That is the first principle to be understood. All men are integral parts of an indivisible Whole; yet each is an individual who must exercise his own freedom to think and to determine.

Man is for ever caught up between the two poles in him: the divine and the demoniacal, the spiritual and the material, the godlike and the animalistic. This duality in everyone has been dramatically protrayed in Chapter XVI of the *Gītā*. It is the eternal conflict between the Self of Spirit and the self of matter, between Unity and separateness, between Light and darkness. Each one is free to choose one or the other. When he identifies himself with the body and believes he is but a biological phenomenon, he exhibits the demoniacal side. Such gross and brutal materialists are described by Śrī-Kṛṣṇa thus:

> . . . they know not purity nor right behaviour, they possess no truthfulness. They deny that the universe has any truth in it, saying that it is not governed by law, declaring that it hath no Spirit; they say creatures are produced alone through the union of the sexes, and that all is for enjoyment only. (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, XVI. 7-8)

What a true portrait of our civilization! And the root cause is indicated: namely, the denial of the Spirit, the belief that there is no truth and no moral order in the Universe. If that be at the root of all the ills which assail humanity today, the cure lies in restoring to mankind the perception of the reality of the Spirit and of the existence of a Moral Law. We can never despair of humanity, for the Divine is also there in every man, and, once we succeed in reawakening his spiritual intuition,

every man will be a revelation to himself and able to transform his lower or demoniacal nature into the pure gold of his inherent divinity.

> Let once man's immortal spirit take possession of the temple of his body, drive out the money-changers and every unclean thing, and his own divine humanity will redeem him, for when he is thus at one with himself he will know the "builder of the Temple."

May we subdue the self of matter and seek guidance from the Self of Spirit. May the Divine Self guide our every thought and action, that we may help dispel the present darkness and usher in a brighter morrow!

NAMRATĀ

LIVE unto the dignity of thy nature, and leave it not disputable at last, whether thou hast been a man. Desert not thy title to a Divine particle and union with invisibles. Let true knowledge and virtue tell the lower world thou art a part of the higher. Let thy thoughts be of things which have not entered into the hearts of beasts; think of things long past, and long to come; acquaint thy self with the dancing-places of the stars, and consider the vast expansion beyond them. Ascend unto invisibles; fill thy spirit with spirituals, with the mysteries of faith, the wonders of religion, and thy life with the Honour of God; without which, though giants in wealth and dignity, we are but dwarfs and pygmies in humanity, and may hold a pitiful rank in that triple division of mankind into heroes, men and beasts. For though human souls are said to be equal, yet is there no small inequality in their operations; some maintain the allowable station of men; many are far below it; and some have been so divine, as to approach the pinnacle of their natures, and to be in the dwelling-place of Spirits.

—SIR THOMAS BROWNE

R. F. RATTRAY

Percipience

[We must mention with regret that since this article was written, Dr. Rattray, an old and esteemed contributor, has passed away. An obituary note on him appears elsewhere in this issue.

The late Dr. R. F. Rattray had a distinguished academic career in English and Philosophy, at Glasgow and Oxford Universities, at Kiel and Marburg Universities in Germany, and at Harvard. He was a Unitarian minister and later President of the General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938-9. During 1951–4 he was President of Manchester College, Oxford, and since 1945 was Extension Lecturer at Cambridge. He was the author of several books. Here he develops a brief but telling argument for a mind inherent in the processes of nature.—ED.]

IT IS most important to be aware of the limitations of the conscious mind. We cannot imagine space as, on the one hand, limited — we are obliged to imagine space beyond: on the other hand, we cannot imagine space as unlimited. We cannot imagine a time before time began, on the one hand, nor, on the other, can we imagine time as never having had a beginning. There is no absolute up and down in the universe: are the Australians hanging down or are we? Chesterton pointed out that if you were to go down a hole to Australia, you would find yourself climbing up. With the Earth as our vehicle we are travelling at 66,000 miles per hour, 18½ miles per second, round our sun. The Earth rotates on its axis at 1,000 miles an hour from west to east. The galaxy in which we are carries our Earth in its rotation at 140 miles a second. Our sun carries us at 12 miles a second through the Milky Way stars. The Milky Way stars bear us at 250 miles a second amid the spiral nebulae.

Roemer, who in 1676 first measured the speed of light (it is 186,330 miles a second), pointed out that the world-as-seen at a given moment depends on the location of the observer, and there is no unique correlation between the succession of instants in consciousness and the succession of events in the outside world. E.g., we observe two phenomena in space: (1) a prominence appears in the sun and (2) a new star flares up in the extragalactic nebulae; but the former happened less than ten minutes ago, whereas millions of years have elapsed since the latter.

There is no such thing as absolute size: big and little are relative. This is of great importance in our views of the universe. The determination of the planets, for example, occurs merely because planets are enormous in the atomic scale and their distances from the sun very large: the *Nautical*

Almanac would be impossible if the solar system were reduced to the size of a molecule. Certainty comes with a massive body. If bodies are very small, one must have very many of them so that the laws of statistics can get near-certainty out of highly uncertain events (as in life insurance).

All experience is mental. It is relative to the powers of the percipients. Sense organs do not perceive; it is the mind that perceives and *quidquid percipitur percipitur secundum modum percipientis* — whatever is perceived is perceived according to the capacities of the percipient. In the central clearing-station in the mind the incoming informations are sorted and decoded, partly by instinctive image-building inherited from the attainments of our ancestors. It is wrong (as Earl Russell pointed out in a broadcast in 1958) to suppose that physical things are as they are represented in the perceptions of them that we have. The "outside" world is a construction of our minds to fit the network of actions and observations we are concerned with.

Of all the vast range of rays of different amplitudes, from infinitesimally small to those of amplitudes of miles, only a very small number are picked up by the powers of perception, including the senses, that we have developed. Although the senses are many more than five, in an ocean of potential experiences these powers are nets through which vast numbers of potential experiences pass unobstructed and unobserved but which include things that have effects on the things we perceive.[1] Each species of animal and bird has senses specialized by the interests of its ancestry. Animals have foci of senses other than ours as well as foci similar to ours.[2] Not all human foci are the same: hence there are people who are "psychic." In so far as other beings share experiences with us, they share a universe common to them and us. Obviously, beings with different images of the universe live in what are to them different universes while at the same time living in one that is common in one or more aspects.

---

[1] "The scientist collects his evidence by using a net with a mesh designed specially to fish up just those elements of our total experience which are amenable to the scientific method. All the rest must slip through and escape him."—*The Times Literary Supplement*, 3 March 1966

[2] The dog's world is one full of intriguing odours, the bat's a place of meaningful echoes, the hawk's a mosaic of finely seen details among which some features of movement betray a mouse or a grasshopper.

The limits of human hearing are between 15 and 20 kilocycles. Children's ears probably respond to 40,000 vibrations per second, adults 20,000. Monkeys respond to up to 50, mice and rats to up to 90, and bats up to 175 kilocycles per second. Crickets communicate in a sound band high in the ultrasonic range. These animals can hear a great many sounds that escape us altogether.

Some birds and insects see things that we cannot see—e.g., bees see ultraviolet. European eels can discern odours in water even if only one or two molecules penetrate their nasal cavity. This means they could discern a scent if a thimbleful of it were diluted in fifty-eight times the amount of water in Lake Constantine.

Modern physics has discovered that every physical thing is changing its physical content all the time it continues to have the same form. There is going on all the time a constant atomic transubstantiation. Professor Beadle[3] has said that a thing

> is not strictly speaking, a piece of matter at all, but rather a place where certain kinds of matter are continually coming together, taking their places in a characteristic pattern of structure and processes, and then departing, giving place to others.

Quidquid accipitur accipitur secundum modum accipientis — what is *assimilated* is assimilated according to the constitution of the assimilating entity. At the animal level, the ox turns grass and other intakes into the various forms and products of its body and we transform our food and other intakes into the various forms of our bodies, although how we do so is lost in utter unconsciousness. In the human body as in all other matter, molecular ingredients are constantly going out and other ingredients from the outside are taking their places. Merely to maintain the *status quo*, millions of our cells must divide every second throughout our lives. Every second 10,000,000 red blood cells die and must be disposed of. Some 80 per cent of the cells of the lining of our small intestine divide every 24 hours: the lining of our small intestine replaces itself every 2 or 3 days. Red corpuscles live only about 120 days. Even teeth and bones are in constant atomic transubstantiation (so long as we are alive: while animals live, their teeth decay, but when they die their teeth do not decay). *Matter is arranged under incorporeal direction. Form is the abiding fact, not content. Form controls content, invisible controls visible. There is an invisible, objective environment conditioning the objects that our senses perceive. The universe is like a tapestry being woven on the "wrong" side, we looking on the outside and the process of creation being invisible to us.* But from the inside we have in our ancestry been taking part in creating and are taking part in creating.

In the light of such considerations, surely it is clear that mindless constituents of atoms could not mould atoms, molecules, viruses, bacteria, protoplasm, plants, animals, man, up to the highest of human beings; that it is necessary to recognize that mind, invisible and intangible, has been at work; that mind is inherited; and that "science" which ignores these conclusions rules itself out of court.

R. F. RATTRAY

---

[3] Nobel Prizeman in physiology and medicine, President of Chicago University.

JOAN N. BURNETT

St. Thomas Aquinas and the Contemplative Life

[Mrs. Joan N. Burnett has written some thoughtful articles in our pages. In this appreciative account of the study of the contemplative life by one of the very greatest of Christian philosophers there is much to ponder and to compare with ancient Indian teachings on the subject.—ED.]

BEHIND the Thomist philosophy, which still flourishes today, is the figure of its great founder, St. Thomas Aquinas, who was born near Naples, of noble parentage, in A.D. 1225 and became in due course a member of the newly founded Dominican Order and university lecturer at Naples and Cologne. From the time of his death in 1274, at the early age of forty-nine, his prolific writings — thirty-two volumes of quarto size in double columns — "have been accepted without break as the classic expression in philosophy and theology of the Christian faith."[1] For, living in a period of great intellectual activity, when Christian leaders were proceeding to re-make the Western world after its destruction by barbarian invasions, "the Angelic Doctor's" unique achievement was to gather up the wisdom of ancient Greece and Rome and Judaism and co-ordinate it as a Christian philosophy which would provide the inspiration for the thought and action of the opening age.

St. Thomas was a scholar rather than a mystic, but he had absorbed the teachings of Dionysius as well as those of Aristotle, and was as well aware as were the Vedic seers that there is a

> most divine knowledge of God, which is attained by unknowing in a union that transcends the mind, when the mind recedes from all things and then leaves even itself, and is united to the super-resplendent rays, being illumined in them and from them by the unsearchable depth of wisdom.

With what Fr. D'Arcy calls "enlightened common sense," he is able to describe the mode of living which forms the necessary approach to this radiant experience. Therefore it is perhaps his treatise *Of The Contemplative Life* which will most come home to Theosophists and add its Western, or Middle Eastern, wisdom to what we may already have learned from the *Ṛṣis* of ancient India.

"The end and object of the contemplative life is truth," says Aquinas, and in dealing with his subject under eight points of inquiry, he follows his usual method — first, a series of objections against the view he means

[1] The Rev. Fr. M. C. D'Arcy in his Introduction to *Selected Writings of Thomas Aquinas* in Everyman's Library (J. M. Dent)

to uphold; then an exposition of that view; finally, the answer to the objections that have been raised.

Two queries in the First Article are most interesting: one, as to the relationship of the contemplative life with the intellect; the other, as to its relationship with the will. His opening premise is that the contemplative life "pertains wholly to the intellect" — "wholly regards the intellect" — but he goes on to add that "as regards the motive cause of the exercise" (i.e., contemplation), "it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions," his apparent conclusion being that as intellect is *moved* "to practise the art of contemplation," contemplation does not lie wholly within its sphere.

He touches next on "the moral virtues," first premising that these "are directed to external actions" (whereas contemplation is wholly internal), then showing them to be a "predisposition" (to contemplation) in the same way as Shankara's "watchfulness and a concentrated mind." He commends them as a curb on the "impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from intelligible to sensible things," and goes so far as to say that "the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation" — which recalls what Shri-Krishna-Prem says in connection with the term *Brahmacharya*, that "the very essence of the inner path lies in self-restraint." Aquinas's conclusion that "the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart" echoes the assurance of another Krishna, a greater, the Lord of the *Gītā* himself, namely that a disciple attains to the full practice of Yoga by "abandoning desires which shake the mind," since

> things that solicit sense
> Hold off from the self-governed.[2]

Aquinas deals next with the various actions, the "component parts" of the contemplative life, listing them as prayer, reading, and meditation. "An angel," he quotes Dionysius as saying, "perceives the truth by simple apprehension," but man has to attain to it by "a process," of which the above provide the means.

We may partly disagree with this last statement, remembering that, as the *Kena Upaniṣad* tells, *Brahman* "is known in the ecstasy of an awakening" — "comes to the soul in the wonder of a flash of vision." But this, of course, is the climax, the consummation; certainly the soil has to be prepared by a way of life, and here "prayer," i.e., communion with the Higher Self, reading, and meditation play a most necessary part. So Aquinas rightly concludes:

---

[2] *The Song Celestial*

> The contemplative life has one act from which it derives its unity, namely the contemplation of truth ... yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act ... the last and crowning act.

He now proceeds to distinguish between "cogitation" and "meditation," quoting St. Augustine's definition of the first as being "any actual operation of the intellect," and describing meditation as "the process of reason from certain principles," but always returning to the assertion that contemplation is, in essence, "the simple act of gazing on the truth."

With close-packed reasoning he then considers whether contemplation should be of God alone, i.e., of the Supreme Principle, or can consist "in the consideration of any truth" — any truth being, as he says, "a perfection of the human intellect," which at first does seem to imply that "any truth" can be a sufficient object for contemplation — but he disposes of this eventually as secondary — "a predisposition" (like moral virtue) — and leaves us on the firm ground that "what belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life."

Aquinas now reaches a vital point in his study, namely, "whether, in the present state of life, the contemplative life can reach the vision of the Divine Essence" — for of course to Aquinas man is "fallen." It seems as if it can, for many mystics have testified to it, but two such authorities as St. Augustine and Pope Gregory the Great cannot admit that this is wholly so. The former asserts the need for a partial separation from the body. "Unless (a man) in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision." The latter maintains that what is experienced is not the Divine Essence *per se*.

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*[3] treats this great question differently.

> How can He [the Spirit, "all-pervading, with no qualities"], be perceived except by him who says "He is"? In the faith of "He is" His existence must be perceived, and He must be perceived in His essence. When He is perceived as "He is," then shines forth the revelation of His essence. [When Nachiketas had] learnt the whole teaching of Yoga, of inner-union, then he reached BRAHMAN, the Spirit Supreme ... So in truth will anyone who knows his own higher Self.

Reaching the sixth point of his inquiry, Aquinas reviews the "movements" of the contemplative life, differentiating, rather abstrusely, on the authority of Dionysius, between such movements "in the angels" and "in the soul," and between movements "circular," "straight," and "oblique."

---

[3] Trs. by J. MASCARO for The Wisdom of the East series (John Murray)

These three movements are based upon the imagery of Richard of S. Victor, derived from "birds of the air," and actually there is less of mysticism about them than of the clear logic characteristic of Aquinas. For the *circular* movement is simply that "by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as centre," while the *straight* is that "by which a thing goes from one point to another," and the *oblique* is "composed, as it were, of the others." It is not difficult to apply these to the actions of the mind in contemplation, and we can also come to rest temporarily in another simple statement, that "external bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of contemplation," which reminds us of Lord Kṛṣṇa saying, in the Sixth Discourse of the *Gītā*, that a *Yogin*

> so devoted, so controlled,
> Comes to the peace beyond, — My peace, the peace
> Of high Nirvana!

Aquinas now plumbs a deeper depth in his comparison of the angelic "intellective power" and the human, showing a consequent difference in the quality of the three movements due to difference in "uniformity of knowledge." The angelic intellect knows truth by "simple intuition," needs not to deduce it, as must that of man, "from the variety of composite objects," and on this he bases an explanation, again drawn from Dionysius, of *why* the movements are as classified above, viz., circular, straight, or oblique. This is purely mystical and profoundly interesting, and of course wholly acceptable to the Theosophist, who holds the hierarchical view of the Cosmos, but, apart from giving us food for meditation, it is not actually *teaching* on the practice of contemplation, being simply, as Aquinas himself says, Dionysius' description of "the movement of contemplation," given with great fullness and depth.

The question "Whether there is delight in contemplation" brings us back to the opening query of the study — "Whether the contemplative life belongs to the intellect only, or also to the affections" — affections in the sense of "appetitive power" — of a longing for truth as "an appetible good, both lovable and delightful." And at first the answer seems to be, No; for "when the soul strives to contemplate God" — here Aquinas quotes St. Gregory — "it is in a state of struggle." It is forced to realize that all things in this lower sphere are imperfect, even its own aspirations and tiny degree of attainment.

However, on second thoughts, delight is seen to lie in the very effort to attain the soul's object and in obedience to the demand implicit in man's nature, namely, contemplation of God. And then comes the reminder that the difficulty lies only in "our defective understanding" and "our corruptible body, which drags us down," for to the soul it is less "effort"

than an instinctive seeking of its divine source, its native element, and even although

> the contemplation of divine things which is to be had by men upon earth is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation, however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated.

One of the arguments against describing the contemplative life as delightful is the sad fact that, for most practitioners, it is not continuous. "A man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only," says Aquinas, and Augustine, after experiencing "a strange sweetness," laments that, all too soon, "through my grievous weight I sink down again." In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* there is a similar warning:

> When the five senses and the mind are still, and reason itself rests in silence, then begins the Path supreme. This calm steadiness of the senses is called Yoga. *Then one should become watchful, because Yoga comes and goes.*[4]

Must it always be so? Yes, says Aquinas, in so far as "that which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous," and the contemplative life, according to Aristotle, "is a life above human measure." But almost immediately, with characteristic common sense, Aquinas reminds us both that our *practice* of it can be continuous, "because it belongs to us in virtue of the activity of the incorruptible part of the soul," and also that *in itself* the contemplative life is continuous "because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things." If he says, "No action can last long at its highest point," he says also that "although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration in the other contemplative acts" — which is simply another way of saying what the Buddha said, that it is incumbent on us to practise mindfulness.

In an appended study, complete in itself, "Whether the Contemplative Life Consists Only in an Act of the Understanding," Aquinas again weighs the *pros* and *cons* regardnig reason and intellect, between which St. Bernard (whom he quotes) distinguishes so narrowly as to equate the contemplative life with "an act of the intellect" rather than with "an act of reason." Aquinas agrees with this, then turns again to the will, that "mover of the other faculties of the soul," and forthwith proves the contemplative life to be not *purely* intellectual, since any "act of the intellect" must be "commanded or approved by the will," whose co-partnership must therefore be admitted.

It is only at this point that we taste a little of the dry subtlety of the

---

[4] Trs. by J. MASCARO, *vide supra*

medieval mind. A certain glow dies out temporarily, especially when he avers that "contemplation does not consist principally in this life, but in the life to come." But we are in accord again when he speaks of philosophers who "kept the latter part of their lives in [?for] contemplating divine things" — the same impulse working in the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages as in the Forest-dwellers of Upaniṣadic times.

Aquinas' style of writing is very different from the poet's vision of those great *Ṛṣis*, but it has its own beauty, and not always an austere beauty either; for it is bound, in dealing so intimately and knowledgeably with the soul, to pulsate with life. It is a study well worth reading and pondering, a masterly analysis of the functions, acts, and "component parts" in which the contemplative life consists, and though written some six hundred years ago, it is as contemporary as our own immediate needs and endeavours.

"The learner is he," says the "Angelic Doctor," "who bends his will to the divine inspiration."

Such a learner every Theosophist would be.

JOAN N. BURNETT

In Memoriam: Dr. R. F. Rattray

DR. R. F. RATTRAY, who died in November 1967, was a philosopher (a "lover of wisdom") in the true sense of the word, and he will indeed be missed as a contributor and reviewer of THE ARYAN PATH. His was a broad, universal sympathy that showed itself in the noble Platonic tone of his mind, in his Unitarian faith, and in his activities with the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, of whose Council he was Vice-Chairman. Born in 1886, his studies at Glasgow, Kiel, Marburg and Harvard Universities — at which last he took his PH.D. in philosophy — must all have contributed to the breadth and depth of his understanding. He held various posts as Unitarian minister, and as President of Manchester College, Oxford, 1951–4. Since 1945 he was an Extension Lecturer at the University of Cambridge, writing also for various philosophical journals. In 1931 his *Fundamentals of Modern Religion* appeared, to be followed by other books, the last being *Poets in the Flesh* (1961). Bernard Shaw and Samuel Butler were two figures that appealed to him, and about whom he also produced books. He could be urbanely scathing about the so-called philosophy of the intellectual-gymnastics type, since the right perception of truth, the ability to blend "universals" and "particulars," meant much to him. His last article for THE ARYAN PATH, "Percipience," appears elsewhere in this issue. His death leaves a gap in the ranks, but his influence will surely remain.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

An Essay Concerning Clive Bell

[Readers will remember the essay on "The Nature of Aesthetic Judgement" by Dr. Arthur L. Herman of the Department of Philosophy, Wisconsin State University, U.S.A., which appeared in three instalments in THE ARYAN PATH (October–December 1967). We begin with this issue his long essay on a distinguished exemplar of aesthetic judgement, the late Clive Bell, one of the most distinguished of twentieth-century theorists and critics of Art. This essay is also in three instalments.—ED.]

I

CLIVE BELL, one of the most stimulating and challenging English art critics of the twentieth century, was born in 1881 and died in 1964. He says, in reminiscing about his early days, that the first decades of his life were especially depressing and miserable since he was continually doing what others, particularly his family, expected him to do, and he was seldom doing what he himself wanted to do. Not until he went up to Cambridge and Trinity College in 1899 did he escape the middle-class provincial clasp of his family and find the kind of freedom in which his mind and personality could grow. At Cambridge he became the close friend of a small coterie of new-wave British intellectuals, Lytton Strachey, Leonard Woolf, John M. Keynes, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, and his freedom become complete. In 1907 he married Vanessa Stephen, daughter of the philosopher Sir Leslie Stephen and sister of the novelist Virginia Woolf, and later became a member in good standing of the famous London literary and artistic group that called itself the Bloomsbury Circle. Through his essays and critical writings, he then proceeded to establish himself in the forefront of British letters and art criticism for the next half-century.

Bell's theory of art can best be summarized by saying that he believed that the experience of art should be a pure and isolated aestheticism, wholly separate from ordinary life, in which one grasps the significant form of an art object; this significant form constitutes "the relations and combinations of line and colour" that produce aesthetically moving forms. It is the nature of this experience of significant form that I wish to focus on in this paper, and especially the position in art which Bell represents so well, "aesthetic formalism."

In an essay of 1913, "The Metaphysical Hypothesis," Clive Bell concludes the presentation of his theory of significant form by saying:

> Be they artists or lovers of art, mystics or mathematicians, those who achieve ecstasy are those who have freed themselves from the arrogance

> of humanity. He who would feel the significance of art must make himself humble before it ... Whatever the world of aesthetic contemplation may be, it is not the world of human business and passion; in it the chatter and tumult of material existence is unheard, or heard only as the echo of some more ultimate harmony.[1]

I should like to take this quotation and compare it with other statements made by Bell, together with similar assertions made in the tradition of an older philosophy of art of the West and the East. By doing this, I do not intend to say that Bell necessarily follows in that older tradition, the tradition of what has been called the *philosophia perennis*. (See Part II of this paper). And yet, so many of the utterances made by this leading formalist in aesthetic theory sound amazingly similar to the cries of the religious mystic and the philosopher intellectually enraptured with pure Being that I cannot help but feel that Bell belongs quite rightfully in that tradition.

Bell argues that in appreciating art we need bring to the work we are viewing nothing from life except "a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space." But at no time should the ideas, feelings, sentiments, and attitudes of ordinary life intrude into or take part in our aesthetic contemplation of the art work. For, as Bell says,

> Art transports us from the world of man's activity to a world of aesthetic exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from human interests; our anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life.[2]

This emotion which lifts us above the stream of life and is felt by the witness to pure aesthetic form, is neither sensuous titillation nor pleasure in the ordinary sense. Bell refers repeatedly to the exaltation felt by the viewer of this pure form as an exaltation dependent in some sense on the intellect. He labels the emotion which this intellectual grounding gives to his feelings "aesthetic emotion" to distinguish it from the irrational life emotions which turn us and twist us at will throughout the day. Because Bell does give an intellectual and rational grounding to this emotion, we have another strong argument for placing him in the tradition of the perennial philosophy. Thus he says of this relation of aesthetic emotion to reason:

> Before we feel an aesthetic emotion for a combination of forms, do we not perceive intellectually the rightness and necessity of the combination?

---

[1] *Art*, p. 55. This collection of Bell's essays was first published in 1914 in London. All the quotations by Bell in this paper are taken from the Capricorn Books edition (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958)

[2] *Ibid*, p. 27

> If we do, it would explain the fact that passing rapidly through a room we recognize a picture to be good, although we cannot say that it has provoked much emotion. We seem to have recognized intellectually the rightness of its forms without staying to fix our attention, and collect, as it were, their emotional significance.[3]

The belief in the intellectual foundation for the recognition and appraisal of aesthetic form, together with the belief in the intellect as the *sine qua non* of aesthetic emotion, enables the philosopher to rise above the ordinary stream of life and "inhabit a world with an intense and peculiar significance of its own." The experience of significant or pure or intellectual form (I am using these words interchangeably) is an ecstatic mystical experience. Thus Bell says of the art object, which gives this pure form:

> Instead of recognizing its accidental and conditional importance, we become aware of its essential reality, of the God in everything, of the universal in the particular, of the all-pervading rhythm. Call it by what name you will, the thing that I am talking about is that which lies behind the appearance of all things — that which gives to all things their individual significance, the thing in itself, the ultimate reality.[4]

He speaks often of losing himself in "that infinitely sublime state of mind to which pure visual form transports me," and he repeatedly contrasts these "superb peaks of aesthetic exaltation" with the "snug foothills of warm humanity." Bell tends to see art as co-equal with and at times even an alternative to religion:

> Certainly both [art and religion] have the power of transporting men to superhuman ecstasies; both are means to unearthly states of mind ... The kingdom of neither is of this world. Rightly, therefore, do we regard art and religion as twin manifestations of the spirit. Wrongly do some speak of art as a manifestation of religion.[5]

Bell speaks of art as a "spiritual necessity," and of the history of art as an "index to the spiritual history of the race" in which art and religion can both be seen as common expressions of this spirit:

> I have said that if art expresses anything, it expresses an emotion felt for pure form and that which gives pure form its extraordinary significance. So, when I speak of Christian art, I mean that this art was

---

[3] *Loc. cit*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 54

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 63. Later Bell says, "Art is the most universal and the most permanent of all forms of religious expression, because the significance of formal combinations can be appreciated as well by one race and one age as by another, and because that significance is as independent as mathematical truth of human vicissitudes." (*Ibid.*, p. 182)

one product of that state of enthusiasm of which the Christian Church is another.[6]

But art does not end merely with an ecstatic, mystical experience of significant form. There are social repercussions tied to the experience. Something happens to the viewer in the process of having this experience that carries over into his practical life long after the ecstatic revelation has passed away. Art is, Bell argues, socially anarchic and intellectually revolutionary in its results. While this is admittedly not the goal of art but merely a by-product, one of the chief glories of art lies in the fact that it challenges and criticizes man's values and ideals. Consequently, art can be destructive of older values and critical of and anarchic to present ones: art can be politically and socially dangerous. And Bell recommends it for this reason as well as for its spiritual necessity.

He says of the aesthetic experience:

> Men and women who have been thrilled by the pure aesthetic significance of a work of art go away into the outer world in a state of excitement and exaltation which makes them more sensitive to all that is going forward about them. Thus they realize with a heightened intensity the significance and possibility of life.[7]

And he continues:

> It is because art adds something new to our emotional experience, something that comes not from human life but from pure form, that it stirs us so deeply and so mysteriously. But that for many, art not only adds something new, but seems to transmute and enrich the old is certain and by no means deplorable.[8]

Finally, he concludes that the result of this stirring is "a weariness of smug materialism and a more passionate and spiritual conception of life." Because we took art seriously we are ever after "unable to take seriously the conventions and principles by which societies exist." I am sure Clive Bell would agree with Bertrand Russell's famous statement concerning "thought" and its implications; he probably could very easily replace "thought" with "art" and thus illustrate his case even more strongly. Russell says:

> Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth — more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to

---

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 95
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 161
[8] *Loc. cit.*

> authority, careless of the well-tried wisdom of the ages. Thought looks into the pit of hell and is not afraid. Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world, and the chief glory of man.[9]

Thus, as a consequence of knowing the Real, man begins to think. Through thinking, his values change. Art reveals the Real to us, and, as a result, art can lead to a revolution in values; though, again, the end of art is the experience of pure form and not social or intellectual revolution. The latter is an adjunct or by-product of the aesthetic experience. This is Bell's case for formalism. It is an interesting mixture of art for art's sake, mystical experience of the Real for the sake of that experience of the Real, with a curious mixture of social and intellectual re-examination brought in as a consequence of that experience. Bell emerges as a pure formalist with pragmatic tendencies.

In the succeeding section of this paper, I am going to attempt to show that Clive Bell's philosophy regarding his experience of pure form is not unlike the doctrines advanced by other persons in the tradition of the perennial philosophy. I hope to show that to this extent Clive Bell resembles the later Plato; the Sufi mystic Hallaj, who also recommends the goalless goal of that Reality that stands away from the snug foothills of warm ordinary life; and the seer-authors of certain of the Upaniṣads; and, finally, that he resembles in his philosophy of art certain representatives of the medieval scholastic tradition in the West.

For these reasons then, viz., that art is grounded in the intellect and not in mere sensuous emotion, that art is revelatory of the Real and that its function is to show that Real to man and not merely afford him an opportunity to engage in a personal emotional debauch, that art stands above ordinary life and gives meaning and significance to that life, but finally, and most important, that the experience of pure form is ecstatic or mystical and related in some sense to ends that we might loosely label as "divine" — for these reasons I will argue that Bell belongs in the tradition of the perennial philosophy. What that tradition is with respect to art, I will try to sketch in the pages that follow.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

(To be continued)

---

[9] *Why Men Fight*, p. 178

G. SRINIVASAN

Choice and Value

[Dr. G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, University of Mysore, is familiar to our readers by his lucid, philosophical articles. He has studied with critical sympathy the thought of the existentialists, especially Jean-Paul Sartre. His comments on Sartre from the standpoint of some of the Indian schools are of special interest.—ED.]

MAN'S BASIC CHOICE is to choose between choice and the lack of it. This statement remains enigmatic unless it is elaborated and clarified. It expresses fundamentally the kind of basic freedom of which man is capable; he is *free* to choose either choice or the lack of it. Choosing choice and choosing the lack of choice are not logical propositions but existential truths. Hence it will be unfair to dismiss the former as tautologous and the latter as contradictory. In the former case, man chooses a life of personal decisions and responsible actions and thereby actualizes his basic freedom, which otherwise remains "abstract" and nominal; in the latter case, he subordinates his basic freedom or choice to an authority other than himself, and thereby neglects and conceals it. The former is man's authentic existence and the latter is his inauthentic existence. Man's freedom chooses itself and sustains itself in his authentic existence, whereas it denies itself in his inauthentic existence. The common presupposition of both, however, is man's freedom to choose between them.

The exercise of choice is the core of authentic human existence and in it man becomes intensely aware of his own personal existence. This is the mode of his being-oneself as against being-lost in the choice-less inauthentic existence. This formal analysis of choice rightly emphasizes its role as a subjective act in authentic existence: but a subjective act of choice is never complete in itself and is always related to *what* is chosen; choice comes to be exercised only in a concrete setting which presents different alternatives, and the alternative chosen in preference to others is the value to which choice is related. Value is thus the objective counterpart of the subjective choice and both are to be equally affirmed as constitutive of authentic existence. *What* is chosen is as much contributive to authentic existence as *that* it is chosen, and authentic existence is a co-affirmation of both. This is a truth which seems simple on the face of it but conceals a paradox within.

Whether value is subjective or objective is a crucial question. If value is taken to be subjective, it will have no objective validity of its own and it will not be obligatory that I should choose one particular value in preference to others: I will be *free* to choose any value I like, and in so choos-

ing it, I will be, in fact, "creating" it; for, anything *becomes* a value to *me, because I choose it* — I do not choose it because it is a value. If such is the case, my authentic existence will consist purely in my subjective act of choice and not in *what* I choose; my existence will be authentic, provided *that* I choose, no matter *what* I choose. But I may always choose what is conducive to my self-interest and hence there will be nothing to distinguish morality from the pursuit of self-interest on this view. Thus, the belief in the subjectivity of values, pushed to its logical end, results in a form of gross hedonism and any real distinction between morality and immorality disappears on this view, since it reduces the one to the other.

Values, therefore, should be accepted as objective and having a validity of their own. The criterion of their objective validity is their universal applicability. If the value I choose may as well be chosen by everyone else without being detrimental to anyone, then it must be considered a value worthy of my pursuit. But, in that case, values are not "created" by me but are only accepted and adopted by me in my conscious ethical activity. What is a value to *all* becomes a value to *me* as well, and its validity is, in this sense, objective and universal. It is not a value because I choose it, but I choose it because it is a value.

This insistence on the objective validity of values marks a shift of emphasis from the subjective *act* of choice to the choice of universally valid values in authentic existence. In other words, man's authentic existence would consist not merely of his subjective act of choice but also of his choice of objective and universal values; for to choose their contraries would make his existence as inauthentic as not to choose them. Objective and universal values thus become imperatives of authentic human existence and not mere options, and anyone who has committed himself to authentic existence has no option but to choose *them*; values being objective and universal, he is no longer their "creator" but has to subordinate his ethical life to them. Subordination of ethical life to objective and universal values thus becomes the core of authentic human existence, and the subjective act of choosing them is only a matter of accepting and adopting them.

The above analysis of the question of values brings us to a dilemma: if values are subjective, morality becomes "relative" to each individual and indistinguishable from the pursuit of self-interest; if, on the other hand, values are objective, human freedom suffers an utter limitation, and morality becomes a matter of subordination of ethical activity to "external" imperatives. But values are either subjective or objective, and hence the inevitable conclusion that morality is either pursuit of self-interest or submission to certain "external" standards or imperatives.

However unsatisfactory these two alternatives may seem to be, still they could capture human imagination and find acceptance at certain periods in the evolution of ethical thought. The former of these alternatives was characteristic of the ethics of the Sophists, as very well expressed in the controversial statement of Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things." The latter was clearly emphasized at a much later date by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who regarded the moral "good" as a categorical imperative and called upon each man to follow it without any desire for a personal reward. These two are extreme alternatives and each repudiates the other.

In contemporary philosophy, the paradox of choice and value has disclosed itself most conspicuously in the atheistic existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's existentialism is founded on his basic commitment to the view that existence precedes essence.[1] He repeatedly affirms that human existence has no fixed content or predetermined essence; it is inherently nothing but pure intentional activity; as such, it is freedom, and in freedom, it "creates" essences or values. Values thus presuppose human freedom and are the products of its "creation"; they are neither eternal essences nor creations of God. In fact, God is a self-contradictory concept and is hence unreal in Sartre's philosophy. Since God does not exist, man is absolutely free in "creating" values and has to take the sole responsibility for them; otherwise there will be no values at all. Sartre assumes that the universe is in itself meaningless or purposeless, and that it is up to man to give it a meaning or purpose. Man does so by "inventing" certain values which he pursues in his life. Values are thus of subjective origin and relative to human existence.

Sartre's view of the subjectivity of values has the merit of emphasizing the importance of human freedom or choice to the utmost in all ethical matters. But its chief drawback seems to be that it makes values relative to each individual and the result will be moral anarchy. Sartre is as much eager to avoid this undesirable consequence as anyone else. He, therefore, insists that, while each individual "creates" values, he must create them not only for himself but for all others as well. He must choose such values and act in such a manner that others may be guided through his choice and activity; the whole of mankind thus comes to be involved in his individual choice and activity. He must, therefore, act with a sense of responsibility for the whole of mankind[2] and the values he "creates" and pursues must have universal applicability. Hence the persistent question

---

[1] JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: *Existentialism*, Trs. BERNARD FRECHTMAN (Philosophical Library, New York. 1947), p. 15

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22

which a man should ask in his ethical life is, What would happen if all others were to choose the same values and act in the same manner as he does? It is only when he is convinced that the values of his choice may likewise be chosen and pursued by others without undesirable consequences to anyone that he must choose and pursue them. But the man who neither asks this ethical question nor seeks an answer to it, Sartre tells us, is a man with an "uneasy conscience."[3] Conscience is thus made the touchstone of moral life in Sartre's atheistic philosophy, and man is answerable to his own conscience ultimately. Conscience is the most intimate moral guide of man, which directs his subjective act of choice towards universally applicable values and cautions him against others.

But the acceptance of conscience as the highest authority in moral matters does not, however, intellectually meet the question, Why should a man choose only the universally applicable values and not others? Hence there is also an attempt in Sartre's philosophy to answer this question intellectually. He points out that man can be freest in a society of free persons, and hence in choosing his own freedom, he must choose the freedom of others as well; this can be done only when he chooses and pursues such values as may be chosen and pursued by everyone. Sartre thus tries to link up the subjective act of freedom with the necessity of choosing universal values, and maintains that the two are inseparable in man's authentic existence; the universal values are to be sustained constantly by a man's subjective act of choice, and hence when the latter disappears, as at his death, the former also disappear *for him*. Thus, while pleading for universal values, Sartre still emphasizes the significance of human choice as their sole basis, and this gives to his philosophy an "inner consistency" which it otherwise lacks.

But this "inner consistency" leaves a fundamental question unanswered. For the question which lingers all through the philosophy of Sartre is, Why should a man prefer universal values to others even when the others are conducive to his self-interest, if all values are likewise going to be annihilated in death, and if there is no "reward" beyond it? This is a question which falls beyond the scope of the atheistic and non-metaphysical philosophy of Sartre and cannot be answered adequately within its limits.

A metaphysical approach to this question may, however, throw more light on the paradox of choice and value, and this is the approach adopted by many Indian philosophers. They point out that man's essential nature consists in his eternal spiritual freedom, and his authentic existence in the world is a process of realizing it fully; the universal values which he chooses and pursues are not external imperatives but only means to realize

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 22

his spiritual freedom. The objective and universal values thus come to be integrated with the individual's intra-subjective spiritual freedom, the realization of which is his supreme goal or value. There is no external check or restriction put on man's ethical choice, since any restriction which he puts on himself in not choosing the values detrimental to the realization of his spiritual freedom is a restriction which he imposes on himself in accordance with his basic nature, spiritual freedom, and as oriented towards it. What man seeks in the exercise of his subjective ethical choice is his own intra-subjective spiritual freedom and the objective and universal values which he pursues are integral to this spiritual endeavour. Subjective choice and objective values are thus both subsumed under a higher spiritual unity which overcomes their apparent discrepancy.

G. SRINIVASAN

Week-end

When this suitcase of mine was packed
For a week-end in the world
With the genes were put in things
Informal and friendly, hair that curled.
Chromosomes like woodsmen's workaday clothes
They gave me, comfortable and easy to wear,
In a loose and loving body with strong bones,
Hardwearing as a leather armchair;
And arms that carry life's parcels lightly —
Dreams and children, thoughts self-owned;
All things appropriate to country cabins
With homely hearts, humble and deep-toned.
Sturdy too the legs I have to stand on,
Sinewy and muscular, agile,
Legs a soul can frame a demand on,
That make a life and love portable,
Latitudes as familiar as attitudes,
Cold and misfortune supportable —
Good striders of this manly planet
Soaring wild and free as a gannet
Where we week-end from the starry blaze
Of the cosmic city and its strenuous ways.

LILA RAY

G. NAGESWARA RAO

"To the Indians Who Died in Africa"

[Shri G. Nageswara Rao, M.A., is Lecturer in English at Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. He did research under a University Grants Commission Fellowship on "The Influence of Indian Scriptures on T. S. Eliot," for a post-Doctoral degree. He is also the Literature Secretary and the Editor of the *Bulletin* of Arts and Crafts Association, Tirupati. Readers may remember his illuminating article on "T. S. Eliot's Use of the Upanishad" in THE ARYAN PATH, June 1967. This essay estimates appreciatively the depth of Eliot's understanding of Indian thought and life.—ED.]

THOUGH Eliot himself has declared the significant influence early Sanskrit literature and ancient Indian thought and philosophy had on his thought and sensibility, this formative influence on him has not received as much critical attention as it deserves. In his *After Strange Gods,* he said:

> Two years spent in the study of Sanskrit under Charles Lanman, and a year in the mazes of Patañjali's metaphysics under the guidance of James Woods, left me in a state of enlightened mystification. A good half of the effort of understanding what the Indian philosophers were after — and their subtleties make most of the great European philosophers look like schoolboys — lay in trying to erase from my mind all the categories and kinds of distinction common to European philosophy from the time of the Greeks. My previous and concomitant study of European philosophy was hardly better than an obstacle. And I came to the conclusion — seeing that the influence of Brahmin and Buddhist thought upon Europe, as in Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Deussen, had largely been through romantic misunderstanding — that my only hope of penetrating to the heart of that mystery would lie in forgetting how to think and feel as an American or a European: which, for practical as well as sentimental reasons, I did not wish to do.[1]

From these words, it is unmistakably evident that for Eliot the study of Indian philosophy did not mean a mere learning of the various phrases and concepts of different Indian philosophers. He realized the necessity of re-thinking the thoughts of those philosophers, taking the direction of thought they had taken and freshly arriving at the concepts they had arrived at. That means that to understand a system of philosophy fully, one has to surrender to it, live it. Therefore, Eliot rightly insisted on the need for understanding Indian philosophy as Indian philosophy and as Indian philosophers intended it to be understood. To understand it through the filter of Western training with a mind stored with all kinds of cate-

---

[1] T. S. ELIOT: *After Strange Gods* (Faber and Faber, London. 1933), pp. 40-41

gories is not to understand it.

Only Eliot, who made a serious attempt to understand Indian philosophy as it should be understood, could feel the demands it makes on a Western reader: a total obliteration of the categorical training he has acquired and a radical reordering of his way of learning and thinking. That Eliot fully realized the responsibilities and difficulties involved in a serious study of Indian philosophy is also evident from what he said about Simone Weil:

> I do not know whether she could read the Upanishads in Sanskrit; or if so, how great was her mastery of what is not only a very highly developed language but a way of thought, the difficulties of which only become too formidable to a European student the more diligently he applies himself to it.[2]

He gave up his study of Indian philosophy because he was not prepared to lose his European identity. The inner compulsion with which he spoke bears ample testimony to the intensity with which he applied himself to the study of Sanskrit literature and Indian philosophy. Later, about the influence of this study on his thought and sensibility, he said:

> Long ago I studied ancient Indian languages, and while I was chiefly interested at that time in Philosophy, I read a little poetry too; and I know that my own poetry shows the influence of Indian thought and sensibility.[3]

One little-known poem of this famous poet, "To the Indians Who Died in Africa," illustrates his full grasp of Indian culture and philosophy. Commenting on the theme of unity and diversity in culture in his *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture,* Eliot maintained that a society formed of classes is better for the preservation and growth of culture than the modern European ideal of a classless society, with a chosen *élite* to spread culture and keep it alive. Classes or castes result from honours given to different social duties. A living caste has a function which makes for the good of the entire society. As culture is a homogeneous society's whole way of thinking and feeling, the best channel for the transmission of culture is the family. For a living culture to exist, the boundaries of social compartments should be so flexible as to enable an individual who acquires real merit to rise from one level of society to another with a ready social acceptance. In India, which has no homogeneity of race, the lack of this ideal and nourishing flexibility led to an unhappy social malady — the ossification of society into rigid castes. But the one good in this many-

---

[2] Preface to SIMONE WEIL'S *Need For Roots* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 1952) p. ix

[3] T. S. ELIOT: *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (Faber and Faber, London), p. 113

sided evil is that it preserved a cultured way of living and feeling intact for centuries. Though this rigid caste system led the evolution of society into a blind alley, it kept a sense of living values very much alive for centuries, in the course of which these values were assimilated into the way of thinking and feeling of even the ordinary people. As Eliot puts it:

> A man's destination is his own village,
> His own fire, and his wife's cooking;
> To sit in front of his own door at sunset
> And see his grandson and his neighbour's grandson
> Playing in the dust together.[4]

The evils resulting from such a tradition-bound and custom-ridden pattern of living are too obvious to need comment. What one has to recognize here is the subtle emotional security derived from this rigid pattern of traditional Hindu life. What is to be noted in this context is the fact that the traditional Indian life is not a mere clinging to a set of dead and dogmatic beliefs and inherited values of life. On the contrary, these beliefs and values of life acquired their living form in the course of the evolution of Hindu tradition. This type of rooted life promoted a blood kinship of "the same people living in the same place." This tradition also imparted a sanctity to all human functions, from the most important religious rite to the conventional way in which a stranger is greeted. Therefore, the Hindu who follows this inherited order of life incurs serious social and material disadvantages, but he gains an emotional security. He leads a full and complete, though circumscribed, life:

> Scarred but secure, he has many memories
> Which return at the hour of conversation,
> (The warm or the cool hour, according to the climate)
> Of foreign men, who fought in foreign places,
> Foreign to each other.[5]

This is only one side of the picture of Indian life. Side by side with this inescapable central authority of tradition, of an all-embracing pattern controlling the social life of a Hindu, there existed a psychological freedom. At the physical level one may make any place his native place, but he belongs to the particular place in which he and his ancestors were born, and the village remembers him as such. At the same time, for a Hindu at the spiritual level, the goal of life's journey is not at all its particular "destiny" in that life. Whatever may happen in a particular life, the chief

---

[4] *"To the Indians Who Died in Africa,"* in T. S. ELIOT: *Collected Poems: 1909–1962* (Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., New York), p. 217.

[5] *Ibid.*

goal of life is to get united with the Absolute and the journey has to go on until his ultimate Union. In a particular birth a man may have to live and die as he is destined to do in that particular life, but all this has a meaning and significance only in relation to the ultimate Union.

> A man's destination is not his destiny,
> Every country is home to one man
> And exile to another. Where a man dies bravely
> At one with his destiny, that soil is his.
> Let his village remember.[6]

Alongside of this emotional rootedness and psychological freedom of Hindu life, there evolved a philosophy of non-attachment and an ethic of detached action. When human life has its value only in relation to the ultimate Union with its Source, the right action of man is bound to be fruitful, even if not here and now. So what may appear as a failure in a particular life could be, in fact is bound to be, a success in view of the ultimate goal of human life.

> This was not your land, or ours: but a village in the Midlands,
> And one in the Five Rivers, may have the same graveyard.
> Let those who go home tell the same story of you:
> Of action with a common purpose, action
> None the less fruitful if neither you nor we
> Know, until the moment after death,
> What is the fruit of action.[7]

As there is no question of failure in the case of right action seen from the point of view of the ultimate Union of individual life with its Source, it is futile to think either of its success or failure. The ultimate result of an ethically just action is beyond human control and comprehension. So, as Eliot puts it in his *Four Quartets,* in this life: "For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business."[8]

In his "The Dry Salvages" Eliot explained the many-sided implications of what Krishna meant when He taught Arjuna this ethic of detached action. He closes the poem with an emphatic reassertion of the ultimate fruitfulness of right action, "action with a common purpose" — a truth which we cannot fully realize in this life:

> And right action is freedom
> From past and future also.
> For most of us, this is the aim
> Never here to be realized;

---

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *"East Coker,"* V, in T. S. ELIOT: *Collected Poems,* p. 189

Who are only undefeated
Because we have gone on trying ...[9]

The unduly neglected, short "To the Indians Who Died in Africa" adequately reveals his laudable mastery of Indian thought and philosophy. What is of special significance here is that Eliot not only assimilated the subtle intricacies of Indian philosophy but also imbibed the very milieu and ethos of Indian life that nourished such subtle thought and deep philosophy. Though his knowledge of Indian life and philosophy was derived through books, he gained a real emotional acquaintance with what he had learned.

As we have seen, Eliot depicted Indian life from the smallest domestic detail to the highest philosophy with an ease that speaks of his perfect mastery. It is no exaggeration to say that he absorbed more of Indian thought and Indianness in two or three years of Sanskrit study than many a scholar has done in a lifetime of study and travel.

G. NAGESWARA RAO

Tagore—Poet of Peace

Gandhiji loved him they were so at one
In deep awareness of all humankind
Each in his sphere a bright and warming sun
Lighting the way for peoples too long blind
The deprived and those denying their fellow man
For both they lit the illimitable span.

DOROTHY ELLIN FLAX

---

[9] "The Dry Salvages," in T. S. ELIOT: *Collected Poems*, p. 199

FRIEDRICH V. LUSTIG

Buddhism in the Union of Burma

[The Most Rev. Friedrich V. Lustig (Ashin Ananda) is the Buddhist Archbishop of Latvia in exile, in succession to the late learned Archbishop, Karlis Tennisons. He was a devoted disciple of the late Archbishop Tennisons and followed him into exile. Both spent many years in Burma, true to their deep Buddhist faith. Readers will remember the Most Rev. Archbishop Lustig's poems in THE ARYAN PATH. In this essay he speaks appreciatively of the sincere and traditional Buddhist piety of the Burmese.—ED.]

A PART of the subcontinent of Indo-China, the Union of Burma, with an area of 261,789 square miles and a present population of about 25,000,000, is a land which intensely desires to develop independently and within the context of her national traditions.

The corpus of fact about the past of Burma, the immense turbulence of the bygone ages, is so vast and unedited that it could only be mastered by a lifetime of assiduous study. Even casual thoughts about Burma can often be full of the excitement of discovery. Of course, what is an exclamation point to one can be a question mark to another. The modern scholar will have to sieve fact from fallacy. The chronicles of Burma, which form the bulk of its historical literature, were first written probably in the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, which was a glorious period in Burmese literature. The oldest Burmese chronicle extant is the *Celebrated Chronicle* by Shin Thila-wuntha, the Buddhist monk and poet of great renown.

The anthropological relationship of various ethnic groups living in the multi-national Union of Burma is not clear, because time and again peoples and cultures moved through this rhombiform country east and west, south and north. The Kachins of Burma, who call themselves "Jingphaw," descended upon this pleasant territory from the region situated between Rangbu Gompa and Drowa Gompa, in Eastern Tibet, probably less than a thousand years ago. The pure Burmese (the Myanmas of the Tibeto-Burmese race) preceded the Kachins and must have come from the Lharugo and Pemako regions of Eastern Tibet, the land of snow-bound mountains and spectacular canyons. For this reason many old beliefs and traditions of the Tibetans survive in Burma, especially that of a monosyllabic and agglutinative language, in which composite words can be taken to pieces and the power of each part shown with clarity. Some scholars, however, believe that the Tibeto-Burmans came southward in three separate waves through the headwaters of the Irrawaddy (in Sans-

krit Irawati or "giver of refreshment"), from where the Chins moved into the Western Hills (the region forming the so-called "Mountain Wall" between India and Burma), the Kachins halted in the "Triangle Area" between the Mai-Kha and the Mali-Kha, while the pure Burmese and the Proto-Burmese moved southward. Whether it was so or not, who indeed can say with assurance?

As a worker in religious and literary fields with many years of travel in Buddhist Asia behind me, I will say without hesitation that, along with the Tibetans, the Burmese are the most religious people on the globe. And I know that I do not exaggerate, for to the lofty Buddhist ideals the people of Burma are ready to surrender their whole being. Everywhere in the Union of Burma you see pagodas and Buddhist monasteries. Eighty years ago Sir James George Scott (Shway Yoe) wrote the following:

> A Burman does not notice the multitude of the religious edifices in his country till he leaves it and finds how far more sparing other nations are in their places of worship. The poorest village has its neatly kept shrine, with the remains of others mouldering away round about it. No hill is so steep and rocky, or so covered with jungle, as to prevent the glittering gold or snow-white spire rising up to guard the place from ghouls and sprites, and remind the surrounding people of the Saviour Lord, the teacher of Nirvana and the Law." (*The Burman: His Life and Notions*)

Yes, it is so. And I admire the departed English gentleman for transmitting to the world this sound information in a way that can be usable to modern ethnographers. Sir James Scott's description of "the multitude of the religious edifices" is true in Burma today. And, what is more important, every Burman knows that not to listen to Lord Buddha Shakyamuni's gentle voice would be unpardonable and would be a sad betrayal of one's own self.

It cannot be denied that under the influence of Western movies and of cheap publications from the countries of the Communist camp a certain vacillation is noticeable in some younger sections of Burmese society, but the Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma is doing everything possible through the press and the radio to protect the good manners and morals of the people. In its editorial of 29 July 1967, *The Working People's Daily*, the official organ of the Government, wrote wisely: "Of all kinds of pollution, pollution of the mind through the injection of unwholesome ideas is worst because it endangers the whole personality."

Lord Buddha Gautama Shakyamuni was not only a teacher of mystic contemplation but sought a higher and better life for all. "Walk a way for the welfare of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion

for the world, for the good, the welfare, the happiness of *Devas* and men" ("Kindred Sayings" in the Pali *Tripitaka*). The Buddha's teaching is a positive message reaching out to higher stages of progress and all-round happiness.

Persons who think that the Buddha's gospel was merely the message of the painfulness of existence and its extinction in *Nirvāṇa* are mistaken, for *Nirvāṇa* is not the immediate goal for all and sundry. Lord Gautama tried to purify and enrich our earthly life here too.

The most popular Buddhist text in Burma is the *Maha-Mangala Sutta* or "The Great Happiness Discourse." Amongst its precepts are:

> ... waiting on mother and father, protecting child and wife, and a harmless occupation (profession), this is the highest blessing ... giving alms, living righteously, helping one's own indigent relatives and doing blameless deeds, this is the highest blessing ... reverence and humility, contentment and gratitude, the hearing of the *Dhamma* (Law), this is the highest blessing ...

and so on. *Nirvāṇa* comes only at the end and is thus in harmony with the good life in this world. That the Buddhists of Burma have chosen "The Great Happiness Discourse" as one of the *sine qua non* books for every home is extremely significant. It is a sign of the people's maturity, indicating a practicality of no mean order.

A good Buddhist is a professed appreciator of the beautiful. There is a mysterious beauty in the Law, and the holy life itself is the Beautiful Life. Said Lord Buddha: "The whole of this holy life consists in fellowship, association, intimacy with what is lovely" (*Samyutta-Nikāya*).

Buddhism came to Burma in hoary antiquity. The country was then known as *Suvarna Bhumi,* "the golden earth," and *Sonaparants,* "the golden land." Ptolemy, the ancient astronomer and geographer of Alexandria in Egypt, in the second century after Christ, uses with reference to Burma the name *Chryse Regio,* which means "the Golden Peninsula." It is known from the history of India that to this Golden Land the Emperor Ashoka the Great of the Maurya dynasty sent two Buddhist missionaries, namely, Sona and Uttara. Buddhist tradition credits this emperor with having erected representations of eighty-four thousand births through which Lord Buddha Gautama Shakyamuni had to pass before he attained to Supreme Enlightenment and *Nirvāṇa*. Emperor Ashoka built the famous Dhamekh Stupa at Sarnath, India. He personally visited Lalitapur, one of the former capitals of Nepal in the Kathmandu Valley, and ordered *stupas* to be erected all round the city of Lalitapur. In Burma Ashoka the Great built the majestic Shwemokhtaw Pagoda in Bassein, 153 feet high as seen at present. This pagoda is adorned with *Sein-bu,* gold vane inlaid with precious stones, and gold and silver umbrellas.

In Ashoka's time Hinayāna Buddhism was divided into eighteen schools, of which in great ascendency was that of the Vibhajjavādins (the Analysers). Hence it is thought that Sona and Uttara, the first monks sent to Burma, belonged to that sect. Yet this cannot be proved. It is immaterial whether Buddhism in ancient Burma was Hinayāna or Mahāyāna. There was no collision between them, and I think both equally preponderated. Buddhism spread rapidly and flourished at Pagan, Powundaung, at Prome (Srikshetra) and in Arakan and Tenasserim.

It is not easy to tell the story of Burma in laconic, disciplined language, so rich is her history and cultural heritage.

In C.E. 107 King Thamudarit founded Pagan at the deep bend of the Irrawaddy River, about three hundred miles north of Rangoon. And in a matter of a few centuries the Burmese civilization is at a high level of development and a challenge to the imagination. The Kingdom of Pagan reaches the zenith of its power in the eleventh century of the Christian Era, when Pagan becomes not only a centre of political power, craftsmanship, and trade, but also an astounding centre of Buddhist creativity. Religious enthusiasm is aroused such as probably no other Asian nation has ever witnessed. Large beautiful Buddhist temples and pagodas are created in accordance with definite technical methods and in a lofty style at a time when the sun of Buddhism is setting in India. Irresistible veneration for the Buddha, the Saviour of the World, is sweeping Pagan. Mahāyāna art blazes with courage, hope, and delight. All the best feelings of the human soul are blossoming forth.

As a child I dreamed of the impossible. But when I saw Pagan as a man with fully developed powers of body and mind, it took me with suddenness and surprise. Spread over sixteen square miles along the east bank of the mighty Irrawaddy, the five thousand temples of Pagan seemed to me the limits of fantasy. Very excited I wept for joy. I realized that I was standing face to face with something immeasurable, pure, lovely, and inconceivable; and the very experience was for me a pearl of great price.

Buddhism with its precise vision of reality is in modern Burma a living and dynamic religion. It is not only practised by the Buddhist monks who study the sacred Pali texts in their monasteries, but by men and women in all walks of life, varying only with the spiritedness of the individual character. In this charming land which can only be described in language brimming with metaphors and hyperboles, the technological onslaught of the nuclear age has not yet led to vitiation or fragmentation of values.

FRIEDRICH V. LUSTIG

New Books and Old

Reincarnation in World Thought*

THIS BOOK is a remarkable study of the problem of reincarnation; it is a study of reincarnation in all ages, and includes selections from the world's religions, philosophers, sciences, and great thinkers of the past and present. It is in six parts: Part I deals with reincarnation in Myth and Symbol; Part II with the world's religions; Part III with Theosophy and Masonry; Part IV with reincarnation among the peoples of the world; Part V with Western thinkers; and Part VI with modern scientists, psychologists, and philosophers. In short, it is an encyclopedia on Reincarnation.

Belief in Reincarnation and Karma is integral to Hinduism and Buddhism (and Jainism); there is reincarnation because there is the Law of Karma; and Karma is the law of cause and effect: "this being, that becomes; the ceasing of this is the ceasing of that." While science applies the law of causality to nature, Hinduism and Buddhism apply it to human conduct. Hinduism and Buddhism appear to have discovered the paradox of death: there is no death unless there is an observer who watches what dies but who does not himself die. There is no birth without death, and life and death are involved in a cycle, and Nature exhibits the law of this cycle. The idea of resurrection must have had its origins, in ancient religions, in the Becoming of Nature.

This idea passed from Nature to religion, and myth and symbol; and the idea was represented in the myth of the phoenix, the mythical bird that burned itself in a funeral pile, and rose out of its own ashes. In Hinduism, there is the myth of the *Puruṣa*, the Cosmic Person, who sacrifices Himself to create the world. Out of the Infinite, the Infinite arises, said the Upaniṣads: the Infinite cycle of births and deaths represents, like Time, the moving wheel or image of eternity. The idea of reincarnation is represented both in dialectic and in myth in Indian thought, and in Plato, and the idea is in perfect accord with modern science.

> In the doctrine of transmigration, whatever its origin, Brahmanical and Buddhist speculation found, ready to hand, the means of constructing a plausible vindication of the ways of cosmos to man

— so said Thomas Huxley, the British biologist and Darwinist.

> I am ignorant of Buddhism and speak under correction, and merely in order the better to describe my general point of view; but as I apprehend the Buddhist doctrine of Karma, I agree in principle with that,

said William James, the American philosopher.

> Although the Way is long, it can be no more wearisome than a single life. For with death we leave behind us memory and old age, and fatigue. We may die old but we shall be born young. And death acquires a deeper and more gracious significance when we regard it as part of the continually recurring rhythm of progress — as inevitable, as natural, and as benevolent as sleep

— so said McTaggart, the Cambridge philosopher. "When I discovered Reincarnation it was as if I had found a universal plan," said Henry Ford.

The Gnostic Christians accepted both pre-existence and rebirth, and believed in the law of cause and effect and the

---

* *Reincarnation in World Thought: A Living Study of Reincarnation in All Ages; including Selections from the World's Religions, Philosophies and Sciences, and Great Thinkers of the Past and Present.* Compiled and edited by JOSEPH HEAD and C. L. CRANSTON. (Julian Press, New York. 461 pp. 1967. $8·50)

cyclical law of change.

There is enough evidence in the collections compiled in this book to show how, in spite of its being officially banned by the Church, belief in rebirth has recurred, in some form or other, in Christianity.

> Like the herbage I have sprung up many a time on the banks of flowing rivers. For a hundred thousand years I have lived and worked and tried in every sort of body

— so said the Sufi poet, Mansur Al-Hallāj. It is not necessary to cite evidence from other religions.

In short, reincarnation stands for the philosophical idea of immortality of life and its continuance, the law of cause and effect, and the law of cyclical change. Nature does not die; it only renews itself. Why should not this be the case with Life, with human life? Death lost its "sting" in the *Ṛgveda* myth, when the *Puruṣa,* the Cosmic Person, offered Himself as a sacrifice, and was reborn out of that sacrifice. Death is not the last stage but a condition of the renewal of life: *yad idaṁ kiñca jagat sarvaṁ prāṇa ejati niḥsṛtam*: "The whole world, whatever here exists, springs from and moves in life" (*Katha Upaniṣad,* II. 3.2).

N. A. NIKAM

The Elephants and the Mice: A Panchatantra Story. Retold and illustrated by MARILYN HIRSH. (32 pp. Rs. 2.00); *Treasury of Indian Tales.* Book I. By SHANKAR. Illustrated by DEBABRATA MUKERJI. (109 pp. Rs. 4.25); *Hari and Other Elephants.* By SHANKAR. Illustrated by PULAK BISWAS. (61 pp. Rs. 3.50); *Our Neighbours.* By CHANDRALEKHA MEHTA. Illustrated by PULAK BISWAS. (51 pp. Rs. 2.25); *Nehru: For Children.* By M. CHALAPATHI RAU. (112 pp. Rs. 3.50) (Children's Book Trust, New Delhi. 1967)

It is a pleasure to commend most warmly these five excellently written, well-illustrated books for the young. At a time when there is great need of good reading-matter for Indian children here is one publishing institution which is meeting that need admirably. All five are both enjoyable and informative and so well produced as to set a standard which would help to form the children's taste. Who could fall away to tawdry "comics" after these? So, apart from present pleasure, they are laying a sound foundation for future readers by accustoming them to good matter and format.

The Elephants and the Mice (suitable for four-or-five-year-olds) is a charming tale set in an ancient ruined city. The illustrations in soft crayon-like colours are particularly attractive, a mixture of nursery fantasies and the archaic. A good lesson on neighbourliness underlies the story.

Treasury of Indian Tales, Book I, is the first of a prospective series of eight. These are folk-stories, "so old that nobody knows who first told them," and as such are full of mother-wit, wisdom, and humour. Princes, princesses, and peasants, talking birds and snakes, play their part in them, and many a "moral" shrewdly pointed will be absorbed unawares into the little readers' minds.

Hari and Other Elephants is for older children — and adults! It should be a general favourite. As, in these stories, "the elephants do only things that it would be possible for an elephant to do," they give some wonderful glimpses of the intelligence and sensitivity of these huge creatures. Each tale concerns one particular elephant and its relationship with human beings. (The only "relationship" we might have dispensed with is the circus one.) Set in South India, the illustrations by Pulak Biswas deserve high praise. In style and colouring, scenery and people, dress and occupations, they faithfully portray present-day life there. This is a wholly admirable book.

Our Neighbours (with a Foreword by K. P. S. Menon) is a most interesting little compendium of facts and observations, attractively presented, about

India's six nearest neighbours: Ceylon, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Western and Eastern Pakistan, and Burma. It could be a useful small book of reference at all times to refresh one's memory as to these places. It, too, is very well illustrated by Pulak Biswas.

Nehru: For Children is serious reading — again, not necessarily for young people only, for it covers expertly those seventy-five vital years of India's history which include liberation, Partition, and the emergence of the modern secular state with its sweeping changes and developing industrialism. But primarily it traces the noble life of the First Prime Minister of free India, whose birthday, 14 November, is now celebrated as Children's Day, thus inspiring these young citizens of the future to fulfil his own ideals of peace and friendship within India's own borders and in the world. What goes to the making of a great man is always interesting, and this is given well in the opening chapters, as are also the influences that helped to shape him later, notably that of Gandhiji. Equally interesting are the personal details of "a rare human being" (p 104). The book, which is written by one who knew Nehru intimately, has a Foreword by Dr. Zakir Husain. The photographs throughout are of first-class quality.

With cordial praise to the Children's Book Trust, one might conclude by saying that, if it maintains its high level, it will play a worthy part in helping "to build that noble mansion of free India" which was Nehruji's vision when he took office as Prime Minister.

JOAN N. BURNETT

East and West. New Series, Vol. 16, Nos. 3–4 (September–December 1966). Edited by GIUSEPPE TUCCI (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente [Italian Institute for the Middle and Far East], Rome. 2.000 *Lit.*; $4.00)

True to its name, this outstanding quarterly research journal has for many years now been serving as a bridge between the East and the West. Its editor-in-chief, Professor Giuseppe Tucci, expert in many languages, both Western and Eastern, including Sanskrit, is not only a keen linguist and historian, but also an archaeologist of repute, having conducted extensive excavations, especially in Swat valley, with significant results. He is also the President of Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (ISMEO). Though this Institute concerns itself with the history and culture of both the Middle East and the Far East, yet in effect it has done and is doing ever so much more for India and her ancient culture than any other institute has done. ISMEO excavations under Professor Tucci's direction have extended also to Iran and Afghanistan. Professor Tucci is ably assisted by a band of devoted research workers, many of whom are his own pupils. The Institute has already brought out scores of excellent publications, apart from reports and memoirs, under the personal direction of Professor Tucci. His original researches cover regions where not many others, not even Indians, have been able to do any work, as, for example, in Nepal and Swat.

The quarterly journal *East and West* mirrors all the varied activities of the ISMEO. Besides, it publishes research papers contributed by outside scholars eminent in their respective fields. This enhances its value as an international organ. This issue contains some very informative and comprehensive articles, with rich illustrations, of great interest both to India and to neighbouring countries. "Problems of Achaemenid Architecture" by Géza de Francovich, for instance, is in fact a respectable treatise on the subject, covering sixty large pages of text and sixty-six pages of illustrations, containing as many as 103 figures on art paper. In it we read, *inter alia,* about the Residential Palace of the great King, the Achaemenid,

Cyrus, identified by some Indian scholars with Kuru of Mahabharata fame.

Y. Krishan's article on "The Hair on the Buddha's Head and *Uṣṇīṣa*" deals with a familiar theme, but his penetrating treatment of the subject has brought out many an unfamiliar element hidden not only in Buddhist literature but also in Jaina and Vedic literature and tradition as well as in sculpture or iconography. His arguments are as convincing as his conclusion is acceptable. Considering that by profession the author is a high government official in the accounts branch, it is very creditable for him to have found time to go so deep into the matter and produce a well-documented study.

Of the other contributions in the same issue, equally illuminating and interesting, mention may be made of Gioragio Stacul's "Notes on the Discovery of a Necropolis near Kherai in the Gorband Valley (Swat — West Pakistan) as also of Suetoshi Ikeda's "The Origin and Development of the *Wu-hsing* (Five Elements) Idea: A Preliminary Essay," dealing with "a type of cosmic philosophy in Ancient China."

Scholars and institutions in India, interested in the study of and research into her ancient culture, who do not know of *East and West* are missing a lot.

B. CH. CHHABRA

Transactions of the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies. Vol. 1: 1965. (The Institute, Rashtrapati Nivas, Simla. 440 pp. 1967. Rs. 50.00; £4; $10.00)

Very few people are even aware of the existence of this Institute, modelled on Princeton, if indeed such a word could be applied to an institution which has no courses of studies, no faculties, no examinations, and will confer no degrees. The aim is to create an atmosphere of real research and scholarship, by providing a congenial venue for men of competence to meet and endeavour to extend the horizons of knowlege. Besides organizing scholar-based and project-oriented regular research work by Professors and Senior and Junior Fellows, there is a plan to invite visiting professors to participate in the work, and also to conduct Seminars and Conferences periodically.

This sumptuously got-up and priced volume celebrates the Inauguration of the institution on 20 October 1965 by President Radhakrishnan. It was marked by a Seminar on "Religion and Society" in which distinguished scholars participated. The texts of the papers read, summaries of the discussions which followed, and rescripts of the special lectures delivered are brought together in this volume, as also a detailed account of the formalities which attended the Inauguration of the Institute and the opening of the Seminar. The speeches and addresses in this part include those by Dr. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Zakir Husain, Shri M. C. Chagla, and the Director of the Institute, Professor Niharranjan Ray. As may be expected, the contents are marked by the unction and conventionality appropriate on so highly sponsored an occasion, and envisage a glorious future for the institution.

The papers were presented at the several sessions, the last one being on 29 October 1965. They have been classified under seven titles: "Religion and the State," "Structure of Religious Experience," "The Individual and Society from the Religious Point of View," "Monastic and Priestly Orders as Factors in Social Welfare," "Religion and Social Change," "Religious Presupposition," and "The Future of Religion." The reports of the discussions are very full and include practically the whole of the speeches of the chairmen for each session. Six special lectures make up the last Part, which also gives a list of the participants, and an Index.

The contents form interesting and

profitable reading. They are not marked by any particular originality or profundity, if we may say so with due respect. It would neither be desirable nor feasible to single out individual papers or lectures for critical notice; but mention may be made of the following: "A Lotus in the Sun," an account of a Buddhist organization — the Soka Gakkai (The Value Creating Association) of Japan by Professor Shotaro Iida from Wisconsin; three papers by Dr. R. V. De Smet of De Nobili College, Poona; "The Value of Religion for Individual and Society" by Mir Valiuddin; and "The Influence of an Indian Religious Lineage in Cambodia and Thailand" by Professor Jean Filliozat. Amongst the Lectures special reference may be made to that by Professor Mikhail Naimy of Lebanon on "The Art Above All Arts: Towards a New Meaning of Man." No mention has been made of important papers by eminent Indian scholars, not because they are lacking in merit, but solely on account of the familiarity of the topics dealt with. Thus Professor Kewal Motwani in his paper on "Conception of Individual and Society from the Religious Point of View" concludes:

> All these eminent men [a long list precedes] in their respective fields have loved, studied and propounded the teachings of Manu, and it would be no exaggeration to say that the next step in the study and understanding of man and his social destiny lies in the direction of *Manu Dharma Sastra*.

That represents the extreme right; the others range round about the centre; and the left is not represented, broadly speaking.

Taking a long-range view, if we should ask ourselves, "How many of these lucubrations will still be worth perusal fifty years hence? Do we sense here the growing edge of knowledge?" we shall be at a loss for an answer.

K. GURU DUTT

Psychoanalysis and Religion. By GREGORY ZILBOORG. Edited with an Introduction by MARGARET STONE ZILBOORG. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. xi+243 pp. 1967. 30*s*.)

Gregory Zilboorg, *emigré* to the U.S.A. from Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, became a good psychoanalyst and a good Catholic. A brief account of his varied pilgrimage is given in an Introduction written by his wife. Much more is told in this selection of essays, edited by her, and all bearing on the importance and possibility of reaching a working relationship, even synthesis, between psychoanalysis and religion; in particular between Freudian psychology and Christian belief.

In dealing with papers written over a generation it is difficult to detect, define, criticize one over-arching theme. In view of Freud's negative attitude to religion and his view that outside science all knowledge is illusion, the reader may well begin with the study of Freud (1951) on pp. 80 ff. Zilboorg does full justice to the master's creative work in the methodology and the study of man but thinks it is not necessary to share that distrust of religion which Freud was unable to recognize because he was unable to know it. From that move on to the perceptive discussion on "Love in Freudian Psychoanalysis," where we see how Freud touched the depth of eternal truth only to fall into the deeper illusion of relegating it to the realm of illusions. The final essay, "Freud and Religion," published shortly before the author's death, sees Freud's unwillingness to accept religious faith in its true meaning as typical of the modern trend to crave for a universe that is simply man-made, with man-made laws for life and living. If only he had followed the implications of his own definition of human normality — working and loving!

It is with the transcendental issues here joined that Zilboorg is concerned in the essays where he is less critical and more positive. These are written at

various levels, and each will say more or less to particular readers whether "priestly" or "scientific" or, in reference to both, "lay." Few will fail to gain something important for the business of living and the understanding of their own nature and destiny.

It seems to me [concludes Zilboorg] that one of the greatest failures of the last century, in the centre of which Freud stands out so boldly, is the failure to recognize that man's true greatness lies in the humble recognition of his task and mission, to follow the mysteries of the world of man and the world of things without superstitious occultism and without megalomanic scientism.

This is well said and carries us a long way forward.

MARCUS WARD

Lear's Self-Discovery. By PAUL A. JORGENSEN. (University of California Press. 154 pp. 1967. $4.50)

"*Nosce tepsum*," "Know thyself," is an urgent imperative for all of us, and this fine study of a great Shakespearean character's involvement in it should aid us considerably in our efforts by showing the kind of questions we must ask as preliminaries.

Drama demands unfolding experience; so Shakespeare's theme is *self-discovery* (the process), not *self knowledge* (the end), and as Professor Jorgensen pursues this through King Lear's last tragic days, he ponders on it with insight and sagacity.

It is surprising to learn at the outset that our own psychoanalytical Freudian century had a predecessor of amazing similarity in the age of the Renaissance. Contemporary thinkers explored the self-image, testing its reality (as we do now) in terms of relationships, potentialities, desires, and repressions, and what emerged was — again surprisingly! — not the "splendid creature" of Renaissance humanism, but man as the poor victim of the "frailty and corruption of the body."

This is the self that the proud Lear must eventually confront and accept, and while he is shown doing so, most movingly, as an individual, Shakespeare, true to his age, reveals him also as Man coming painfully to terms with his humanity.

It is no belittlement of a drama "unparalleled in imaginative grandeur" to feel the fascination of looking into the mental workshop in which it took shape, and to learn from the section entitled "Some Renaissance Contexts" how many ideas that were in the air in Shakespeare's day have been given immortal expression by him. Rather, his genius is magnified when we see how powerfully these have been personalized as living characters.

Professor Jorgensen's range of Renaissance reading is wide and he has made truly creative use of it. Creative also is his elucidation of "the Lear world" — the whole psychological flux of the king, his daughters, and the rest — from sapient scrutiny of the dialogue, so that a full mental state is deduced sometimes from a single metaphor or a broken half-sentence.

Students of Shakespeare, and of human nature (which surely implies *all* readers!), will find this book absorbing and illuminating, a new approach to a great play, and, incidentally, an aid to self-understanding.

JOAN N. BURNETT

Modern Aesthetics: An Historical Introduction. By THE EARL OF LISTOWEL. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 221 pp. 1967. 45*s*.)

Of all branches of philosophy, aesthetic has received least attention from famous thinkers. It requires a peculiar blend of qualities, so as to avoid both the half-philistine intellectualism of the specialized philosopher and the undis-

ciplined intuitions of the artist or dilettante. Precisely this union of rigour and sensitivity distinguishes the present work, a revision of the 1933 volume which already proved a useful continuation of Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic*. The author deserves further thanks for holding the balance between contending theories derived largely from diverse temperaments (extending, e.g., even to the conflicting classifications of the arts). Thus he can praise the merits of "formalism" while protesting that "aesthetic experience is infinitely wider and deeper than the mere fabrication or enjoyment of symmetry, balance, and proportion"; art is akin to play, yet very different from it (a pity that the *Līlā* concept is not mentioned); the "narrow intellectualist" Müller-Freienfels is yet commended for insisting "on the variety of individual experience in the enjoyment of art." Aesthetics employs diverse methods: phychological, objective (critical, historical, etc.), genetic, or purely philosophical. The author's sympathies are mainly with psychological theories, above all with those of *Einfühlung*, Empathy (Volkelt, Lipps, etc.), which receive a close analysis.

Successive chapters deal first with "Subjective" theories, those of Expression (Listowel is somewhat unfair to Croce); Pleasure; Play; Appearance and Illusion; theories of Psychoanalysis; Experiment and *Einfühlung*; the psychology of Creation and Appreciation. Next come "Objective" theories of the "Science of Art," Phenomenology, Form. Between "Towards a synthesis" and a final statement are helpful accounts of "The Minor and Industrial Arts," "Genetic Aesthetic," and "Some Aesthetic Categories" (sublime, tragic, comic, etc.).

The praise given to Dessoir for his "eclectic ... anxiety to explore every cranny of our experience of art and beauty" could be applied to Listowel himself. An even richer work would take account, e.g., of such art-forms as film, ballet, musical performance, Chinese calligraphy, and would also include reference to both Sanskrit and Far Eastern thought, so original in aesthetics; these are almost wholly absent from this otherwise almost indispensable treatise.

The Bibliography is excellent.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

A Child's Questions Answered, or God is Ever Young: A Child's Questions Answered from all the religions of the world. By MAUD KENNEDY. Illustrations by RICHARD KENNEDY. (Regency Press, London. 109 pp. Illustrated. 1967. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Here is a truly helpful book which comes at a time when educationists all over the world are deeply concerned with the child and religion. In England, in particular, there is a great examination of the school syllabus of religious education, and controversy as to whether religion (Christian or otherwise) is a proper subject for the school at all.

All concerned with the care and upbringing of children will find the questions, answers, and illustrative stories of this book an inspiration and a guide to further study.

Such questions as "What is God?" ... "Where is Heaven?" ... "Do animals have a soul?" ... "What are we here for?" ... "What happens to us when we die?" are answered in a straightforward manner, suitable to children of different ages, giving many ideas culled from the great religions of the world. This is done in so sympathetic and skilled a manner that it would be impossible for the most prejudiced to be offended. Those of us who have deep convictions on any topic may choose the part of the answer that seems most true to us; but for the many puzzled seekers after truth the complete answer or set of suggestions will be truly helpful.

There is, also, a very delightful section on "Fairies and Nature Spirits" in which the author says, "The simple Celtic people who live close to Nature

and whose minds are not spoiled ... have always been known to see spirits and fairies throughout history."

Maud Kennedy, herself a mother, states clearly: "To the mothers of the world of every religion or of no religion God is Love." Also, and of vital importance: "We must never think that we have the only religion that is true ... God is Infinite, therefore truth is Infinite."

Although this is, primarily, a book to answer children's questions on the most important topics of life, and therefore of especial use to mothers, teachers, and students, it is of the greatest interest to the general reader, and may well help to clarify many minds, and to set them on the path to greater understanding.

There are useful Contents and Bibliography, and the whole is graced by some pleasant illustrations. Best of all, it is written plainly, sincerely, and with humility. (The only fault is the binding — this is so weak the book falls apart — a great pity!)

ELIZABETH CROSS

From the Flow of Life. By NATWARSINHJI. (Rupee Series, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 56 pp. 1967. Re. 1.00)

Watching the teenagers of our day one sometimes wonders whether the human race is in danger of losing one of its most precious assets — the mature, philosophical, reflective mind, able to add its quota of wisdom to Man's heritage. This generation shows little promise of contributing to the treasure-house of human wisdom.

From the Flow of Life stems from another and more privileged generation. It is a collection of reflections on life which mirror a mature and serene personality, a self-governed mind, and an unceasing, unwavering pursuit of excellence in its truest and most permanent forms. The author, Maharaja Natwarsinhji of Porbunder, appears to have been born with not just the traditional "silver spoon" in his mouth but also with a pot of ink, a tube of oil paint, a willow branch, and a fiddler's bow to hand, not to mention symbols of other accomplishments, over and above his writing, painting, music, cricket, successful administration, and launching of humanitarian projects.

On the basis of the author's many-sided experience alone, the book would have been worth while, but it has many facets which, as the following quotations will show, make it acceptable and stimulating:

> Perhaps the most effective form of disarmament would be to divest ourselves of those harmful thoughts which may have colonized our heads and hearts.
>
> It would be enlightening if in the process of assessing the number of those upon whom we could depend the most, we were to discover ourselves to be those upon whom we could depend the least.
>
> Fortunate would be he who would have the wherewithal to give when he would have the will, and the will to give when he would have the wherewithal.
>
> We should assess our generosity not only by what we give, but also by what we could afford to give and yet do not.
>
> The true value of resignation would rest in its being unborn of any frustration.

HILLA C. VAKEEL

Window to the West: The Travel Diary of an Indian Writer. By D. ANJANEYULU. (Triveni Publishers, Madras. 144 pp. 1967. Rs. 5.00)

This first book by Shri Anjaneyulu will not only be a welcome addition to books of travel but also of interest as the expression of a gifted personality, with deep and varied interests, in literature, nature, culture, art, and architecture. By his accurate and lively description, he has provided a "window"

upon nearly twenty foreign cities. "The vision is bright; the landscape is good."

Though this is not a guide-book, our author has invariably furnished useful and significant details such as arrangements available for boarding and lodging in different places.

Most interesting of all are his visits to the birth-places of Shakespeare, Tolstoy, and others of celebrated memory.

A melancholy note runs through the book because Smt. Anjaneyulu, the author's *sahadharmacāriṇī* and partner of these travels, has died subsequently in tragic circumstances. "One can find her personality peering through the pages of the book at many places."

No page in the book is dull or dry.

K. E. PARTHASARATHY

K. G. SAIYIDAIN

The Priority of Education

[On 11–16 December 1967 the Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, was the venue of an Asian Seminar on Implications of Planning Education. We are glad to publish a part of the Address of Welcome by Dr. K .G. Saiyidain, an old and esteemed friend. Only a few remarks related to the special occasion have been omitted from this part. Dr. Saiyidain's is a wise approach to the claims of different aspects of education and of education in the whole of human life.—ED.]

PERSONS who determine planning policies and allocation need to understand, as vividly as possible, the priority that education occupies in the scale of national priorities and that the achievement of most other crucial targets depends on the efficiency of the educational system. It is true that, *as* educators, we *do* value education highly as an article of consumption — that is, as something which enriches the mind, directs the growing personality towards desirable goals, and cultivates habits, attitudes, and values which are essential for leading the good life, both personally and socially. But we are also growing increasingly aware of its productive role, of the need to make it an efficient instrument of achieving objectives which are dear to the heart of the economists and the economic planners. In the more recent trends visible in educational thinking we find this point of view clearly reflected. I say educational *thinking* advisedly, because in *practice*, whatever our best educational philosophers and theoreticians may have said, the average teacher and the average student has been, on the whole, unduly obsessed with narrow, vocationally biased objectives — the student, with getting a certificate or a degree that will enable him to try his luck in the service market; the teacher, with enabling him to pass the requisite examinations somehow.

To some extent, therefore, the debate is *not* between those who advocate liberal values and those who stress technical efficiency. It is often a dispute whether the vocational purpose of education is defined narrowly or in comprehensive terms. Luckily, however, there is really no basic antithesis between the qualities and skills which make a person a good earner or productive agent and those required for making him or her into a good man or woman. It is only a narrow, un-enlightened interpretation of what is required that creates this illusion of dichotomy between the so-called liberal and vocational or general and technical education. Would you, for example, say that qualities like efficiency, integrity, co-operation, pursuit of excellence are less important in technical education than in general education or vice versa? I recall to myself the famous remark of the great German educationist, Kerschensteiner, who said that "the education of the worker is the door

to the education of the man." And two of our great leaders of thought and action, Tagore and Gandhi, have stressed it in their own way just as emphatically — Tagore, through the educational work which he did at Shantiniketan, where arts, crafts, manual labour, rural work, and service to the community were envisaged as an integral part of education; Gandhi, through the scheme of basic education which he initiated and whose cardinal principle was that work, particularly manual work, should be made the pivotal point of school education and all knowledge acquired in its stimulating and realistic context.

The point I am stressing is the basic importance and priority of education, which remains unaffected whether you are interested more in its productive or its consumption aspect. If you want to achieve Plan targets, you have obviously to provide adequate financial resources — no-one can deny their importance — but it is even more necessary to improve the efficiency, the productivity, and the character of the individuals who are to be the agents of the desired achievement. And this is obviously an *educational* problem, in the wider sense of the word. While it may be possible in affluent countries or economies to make money do the work of men, in economies of comparative scarcity — such as most of the countries of this region have — it is *men* who must learn to do, in considerable measure, the work which money does in the former. This would seem to indicate that, in poorer countries, education is *not less but more important* than in richer countries, that they need greater technical and social skills to solve their problems in an economic and efficient manner. They cannot afford waste or stagnation, though it must be frankly recognized that at present they suffer more from them than the richer nations.

Now, it may well be said: Granted all this, what can the harassed planners and finance people do when they are beset by insuperable financial difficulties and they have to meet a variety of needs within the scarce resources available? As I have already said, this is, within reason, a situation which we, as educators, should frankly recognize. But only within reason. The argument may not be new, but it would bear repetition that the resources which a country can find for any particular department of its activity depend in a large measure on the priority which it accords to it. How does it happen that, in almost all countries, when people are labouring under the impression that they have exhausted the maximum limit of their resources, comes a war and we suddenly find that the cow is capable of giving a much larger amount of milk than was thought possible? History affords numerous examples of this strange phenomenon. But it is only "strange" for those who are not prepared to look the problem of priority in the face. I venture to submit, in all seriousness, that, speaking globally, we have *not* yet recognized, in our innermost being, the simple truth that construction is more important than destruction, that peace is more important than war, that (in the words of Bertrand Russell) "mass murder is *not* the most important duty of man," that service is more important than exploitation, that a good deal of what is regarded as national honour and prestige in the field of international relations is a reflex of old traditions and prejudices which have little meaning in the world of today. If we could begin to see even dimly the truth in this unorthodox statement, some of our pressing problems would perhaps be solved more quickly.

This brings me to a final point which is really a further amplification of what I have just said. Not only can our nations find more funds from their own sources but also the creation of the conditions for peace and a reduction in the present scale of expenditure on war and preparations for war by the richer countries can release enormous funds which, channelled through international

organizations or bilaterally, can go a long way towards solving the problems of ignorance, poverty, and disease which beset the poorer two-thirds of the world. According to a rough calculation made by responsible sources, the so-called defence of the richest countries equals the *total national product* of all the poorer countries! This is, in all conscience, a stupid and criminal situation, and peoples of the world can tolerate it because long experience has unfortunately hardened them to it. I have ventured to draw your atention to this fact, not as a kind of peroration, but because it shows that the cause of progress in all desirable directions, including educational planning, is intimately linked up with the cause of peace, which is the supreme purpose of the United Nations, the UNESCO, and all other international organizations, as it is and has been the inspiration of all men and women of faith and good will. If we do not tackle the problem of peace, all other crucial human problems will remain unsolved.

K. G. SAIYIDAIN

Bhatia Endowment Lectures: 1967

[The first of Smt. Vijayalakshmi Pandit's Bhatia Endowment Lectures, 1967, at the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, appeared in our February issue. In the second, which we print below, she considers some basic questions of values, which have become even more important in the world-situation resulting from the application of modern science.—ED.]

Science and the Humanities: II

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE in the present age to isolate one subject from any other, for like the different facets of life they are all intertwined and each has some bearing on the other; neither can an individual or a nation live in isolation any more: this is another imposition of science — that we should live together. "No man is an island unto himself," says John Donne; "We are all part of the mainland." When these words were written they were, in a sense, a poet's vision. Today, centuries later, they make sound practical common sense. I have often thought, if our educational system could include in its curriculum a course in how people should live together, now that science has literally thrown them together, how great a benefit would accrue to the world!

Many of our problems stem from the fact that we have been taught to accept false values. From our earliest years we live in little compartments, as it were — regimented and restricted in a thousand ways. Recently, I was in Montreal at the famous Expo 67. The theme of this Exhibition is "Man and His World" and apart from the various national pavilions, there are what are called the Theme Pavilions. In one of these we see man a prisoner from birth until the time he departs from the world. This is graphically displayed by models. The caption which impressed itself on my mind was "mankind is in prison — the padlock on its cell is discrimination, the key is freedom and equality." How true this is! We are born, grow up, die, and all through this few are so fortunate as to have an upbringing in which the clear light of reason guides them onwards. It is still usual for the taboos and prejudices of a bygone and outworn era to become the guidelines for living. We are taught hate, not love. We learn to put those who are different from ourselves in colour, or ways of speech, or dress into an inferior category and judge them accordingly. Barriers grow up, and soon communication between unlike people ceases. Only superficial ties remain; gradually the

gulf widens and we glare at each other across it. If there was a real desire on the part of those who control our political destiny to make India one, priority would be given to lessons in the art of coming together.

It is not at the university stage that you can teach such a subject. It begins in the home — in the cradle almost — it should continue in school. The State should provide many opportunities outside school for boys and girls to share in various activities so that a feeling of belonging is created and through it a sense of responsibility towards each other. This is basic to the needs of democracy and for the advancement of a new generation which can walk in step and be in tune with the new age. Later, when the student has reached maturity and is in university he or she can profit by the lessons of the Humanities and be guided by the wisdom of the past into wise action in the present. This would be a real contribution towards social progress and permanent peace.

Science and technology like everything else require an atmosphere in which to grow. This is of the highest importance if we expect science to produce results which will satisfy the demands that science itself has created. The relationship between man and man; the relationship of one group to another; their joint relationship to environment — these are dominant problems of our time. They should not be dismissed lightly; for when properly adjusted they hold the key to better national and international understanding.

I am aware that some people might dismiss this idea by saying we do deal with this problem on the sociological plane and that it has yielded results during the last decades. But such an answer would only show an unawareness of the real issue, an adherence to the letter but no understanding of the spirit behind it. We have in Urdu a graphic saying, *Lakeer ka fakir,* "the fakir [in this sense, the slave] of the line" — in other words one who cannot appreciate the nuances between the lines, without which, of course, the line itself is meaningless.

Science seeks to transform the world. Democracy seeks — or is supposed to seek — the welfare of the individual. Neither together nor separately can they succeed unless there is first a transformation of human nature. I quote Swami Ranganathananda:

> It is only spiritually disciplined individuals and groups that can insure for humanity at large the values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; of liberty, fraternity and equality. The peace and happiness of man and the stability and the ordered progress of civilization depend on the intensification of the spiritual awareness of humanity. With this spiritual awareness for foundation, the structure of civilization raised by science and democracy becomes strong and steady; without it, it sways in periodic crises to topple down eventually.

Do we give sufficient thought to this, or shall we be content merely with the trappings of democracy and some small material benefits from science?

"Education," said Jefferson, "holds the key to the stability of the democratic order." If democracy merely meant the exercise of a vote once in five years, it would still require education; but it means much more. Gandhiji said:

> Democracy, disciplined and enlightened, is the finest thing in the world. A democracy prejudiced, ignorant, superstitious will land itself in chaos and may be self destroyed;

at another time he said:

> to me political power is not an end but one of the means of enabling people to better their condition in every walk of life. Political power means capacity to regulate national life through national representatives.

Therefore, the national representative must have high qualifications and a true sense of responsibility. This kind of education does not just happen. It must be planned and acquired over a period with continuous effort and with maximum assistance from the State. It is because we do not lay emphasis on

this that we see indiscipline and near chaos in our legislatures and in Parliament.

The process of education for citizenship as for other things begins in one's earliest years and requires as much thought and planning as the most evolved of our Five-Year Plans. For lack of this, certain tendencies are becoming apparent in our national life which are encouraging the very things real education tries to cast out.

The reading material provided for youth in the Indian languages is not calculated to make an appeal. It is not geared to the present mood. It does not tell the story of the new world in which we now live with the dramatic touch to which youth will respond. It does not attempt to dress old thoughts in a new garb. In fact it often fails utterly to fulfil the demands of a boy or girl born in the atomic age. Is it any wonder that our boys turn to space comics and our girls to cheap movie magazines for excitement and glamour? We need a new kind of literature which will make old truths come alive and be as exciting as any adventure story.

Some years ago the B.B.C. televised a series of Bible stories from a new angle, I saw one of these. The beautiful old story was told and acted in language and dress far removed from one's conception of the Bible, but the teenage British boy and girl seemed to find it quite normal. Talking to the then Archbishop of Canterbury, I mentioned how startled I had been. He said he felt the same way but, he pointed out, hundreds of boys and girls who refused to have anything to do with the Bible were made aware, through this TV series, of stories which an earlier generation had learnt at their mother's knee; and, because the dress and language were in keeping with the times, the moral of the stories also went home.

This is a lesson for us. We must not forget that the slogans and stories that passed without question in an earlier and static age do not satisfy the demand of developing societies, but, in coping with such demands, we must beware of the temptation of distortion to suit our ends. It does not pay to do this and the growing trend for each State to magnify out of all proportion its past glory and present leadership will loosen our foundations and insulate us still further.

It is a sorrowful fact that the story of Gandhiji is hardly known now; Tagore is a Nobel-Prize-winner; and Vivekananda, that great and noble soul, is merly a mention in our history books; as are so many other fine men whose thoughts have moulded our country. Jawaharlal Nehru said:

> I do not know how many of the younger generation read the speeches and writings of Swami Vivekananda, but I can tell them that many of my generation were powerfully influenced by him and I think it would do a great deal of good to the present generation if they also went through his writings and speeches, for they would learn much from them. They are fresh and relevant today because he spoke and wrote of fundamental matters. He was no politician in the ordinary sense of the word but he powerfully influenced the national movement and I think the younger generation might take advantage of this fountain of wisdom, of spirit and fire that flows through Swami Vivekananda.

Continuing the same line of thought, I feel that if the innumerable ugly statues and portraits of Mahatma Gandhi were to be removed and in their place our children and our youth were to have books giving the wonderful and the exciting story of his life written with feeling and imagination, there is no doubt he would occupy a proper place in their minds and hearts. But if the only way in which we can interpret the Father of the Nation to the next generation is by depicting him as a man with some strange ideas — then indeed we have lost youth and youth has lost a vision.

Each country has a national ideal. Dr. Radhakrishnan describes the ideal man of India as "the free man of spirit — one who has freed himself from the prejudices of his time and place." It is

India's pride, he says,

> that she has clung fast to this ideal and produced in every generation and in every part of the country, from the time of the Rishis of the Upanishads and Buddha to Ramakrishna and Gandhi, men who strove successfully to realize this ideal.

This is the magnificent heritage of India. It is this heritage that we must be taught to cherish; for through this alone can our roots be nourished and we contribute to the welfare of mankind.

Basic to all our dreams for the future is peace: peace in our country, peace in the world. Why then do the best efforts of many people in many lands fail in making peace a reality? My answer is that through the centuries war has been made to appear glamourous. To kill and be killed for one's country has been regarded as the highest form of patriotism and little boys grow to manhood with this picture firmly implanted in their minds. The UNESCO Charter reminds us that wars begin in the minds of men and, therefore, the defences of peace must also be built in the mind. The first defence is to present a correct picture of peace and not equate it with an absence of conflict. Peace is much more than that. It is subtle and varied in its manifestations. It is a suspension bridge delicately slung over a yawning chasm and can only be crossed if the eyes are clear and the feet steady. Peace is vital and vivid and beautiful. She is a jealous mistress and demands complete dedication and continuous service from those who seek her favours, but to serve her is to achieve complete fulfilment.

I would like every Indian boy and girl to be brought up to appreciate the fact that the biggest and most exciting adventure in the world is to *live* for one's country — to serve her and cherish her no matter what the odds, for it is through such efforts that India will rise again.

Let us respond to the challenge posed by science in this manner and make a positive affirmation of our beliefs. Let our talisman be the message of Vedanta — fearlessness, harmony, universality. There are many hurdles in the path of India's progress but *none* that she cannot surmount.

VIJAYALAKSHMI PANDIT

Correspondence

Hermitage

Hove, Sussex, 10 January 1968

NEARLY THREE YEARS AGO I "reincarnated" in this house by coming from another house close by where one could not live with oneself for more than ten minutes of the day. There were television sets, small radios, a parrot or two, teenagers "with it," and a small "Pop" Party with (amateur) guitars and small drums. This house to which I have returned has undergone changes in its clientele since I settled down again. The basement and the first floor may be likened to a convent in that the inmates of the one-room flats are ladies. The second and third floors are inhabited by men and so may be thought of as monastic. One need not encounter anyone else, and, to make it more what I find I want, the others politely avoid me because I am deaf, and as one or two have said: "You will not wear your ear-aid and so we can't talk to you." When I do wear the contrivance, they shout if they meet me, but not (on

principle) if I am not properly dressed as an old deaf-adder should be.

I find that the Way to Liberation is greatly helped by the withdrawal and inward in-dwelling as a consequence. There is less temptation to arouse the Ego-Sense which hinders all Reality. The Ego-Sense is what stands in the way of the Ego. If I can say with Swami Ramdas: "Oh God, You do Everything," I am safe. That is, if I mean it as well as say it. "As long as you think you can help yourself," says Ramdas, "you have to struggle. Struggle ends in surrender." Spiritually speaking, that Surrender means being "with it." And as an easy way to the obliteration of the Ego-Sense in order that the Ego may lead itself into Liberation, a one-room flat at the top of a house in Hove, Sussex, can furnish the best touches of Aloneness without loneliness that any recluse or hermit in modern life need wish for. It is, in fact, a discovery that talking even on spiritual subjects and even with the choicest of affable friends is a snare if you want to truthfully experience without knowing you are doing it. A mystical poet has said somewhere:

> If thou could'st empty all thyself of self,
> Like to a shell dishabited.
> Then might He find thee on the ocean shelf,
> And find thee with Himself instead ...
>
> But thou art so replete with very thou,
> And hast such shrewd activity,
> That, when He comes, He saith "This is enow
> Unto itself. 'Twere better let it be
> It is so small and full,
> There is no room for Me."

Of course, one could be replete with "very thou" in a one-room flat and too deaf to hear or be spoken to, and with not a solitary friend or relative left to pay the most casual visit. Some wiseacres would possibly say that such a condition is just what would make the Ego-Sense a veritable fiend in the inner man. Agreed. If the condition is forced on a man as by *Karma*. Or even if the man forces it on himself as some hermits have done in the name of their religion. No, there must be no forcing of any kind; that means the Ego-Sense is rampant. And one can come to terms with *Karma*, especially at eighty-odd. One has overdrawn on life's bank after seventy, and *Karma* will be very kindly disposed to re-arrange for an Old Bloke who has possibly been granted up to ninety and onwards so that he may come nearer than was expected by his turbulent youth and calculating manhood. He is (strictly speaking) no longer a man. Paul, mentioning the unusual case of Old Father Abraham begetting a son at ninety (though Sara, about the same age, conceiving the child was a greater miracle) — Paul speaks of Abraham "as being almost dead." And the Shakespeare version of a man "sans everything" need not be quoted. So *Karma* is inclined to be lenient to such old patriarchs. She says, so to speak, "Now is your opportunity for full surrender of the Ego-Sense. No matter how far back your *Karma*, fixed by your ancient actions, went or how potently it came into your present life, almost paralysing you, it is all over now. It would not be right to grill an old Presbyter after eighty, at the least. Now is your chance to be quit of Everything Karmic with an easy surrender to God — or whatever you name It." So I am rather happy at the moment, a moment that may last for another ten years; no, twelve years, so that at one hundred I may deserve a letter of congratulations from the Queen as sent to all centenarians in due course. "You might as well be dead," says some sceptic. Don't you believe it! Shame on you, you insolent teenager, for suggesting it. I am being liberated. I am not following any of *your* pastimes and pursuits; the way you are going on you will be lucky to reach fifty. "What have you gained," says the young sceptic, "as a result?" What I want you to gain when you reach a half-century. "What is that?" This from Alice Meynell:

> I'll not reproach

The Way that winds, my steps that err,
Access, Approach
Art Thou. Time, Way — and Wayfarer.

In one hallowed word: GOD. Bless everybody.

E. V. HAYES

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

In the thirties occasional mention was made of killing (on a small scale) by sound. Now research into "infra-sound," especially its potentialities as a weapon of destruction, has made it a threat. Fortunately, it is as yet non-directional, and thus as dangerous to the operators as to the "enemy." Further, the lower the frequency, the larger the mechanism needed, which makes it too unwieldy at present.

Human hearing registers a range of 16 — 20,000 sound-vibrations per second. Infra-sound is produced by air vibrations oscillating at less than 10 vibrations per second.

In 1964 the Electro-Acoustical and Automation Laboratory of the French National Centre for Scientific Research, under Professor Vladimir Gavreau, discovered that the frequency of a giant ventilator of a nearby factory was causing nausea and headaches in the laboratory staff, due to painful rhythmic compression of the ear-drums. Low-frequency waves build up an intense and intolerable reverberation in solid objects, that can shatter buildings and living organisms. Frank Dorsey (*Sunday Times,* 16 April 1967) and John Davy (*The Observer,* 7 January 1968) have both described the fantastic and dangerous story of the team's research. One experimenter became a "life-long invalid." The first test nearly killed the lot, and made everyone within range of the vibrations sick for hours.

"It not only affects the ears," Professor Gavreau says, "but it works directly on the internal organs. There is a rubbing between the various organs because of a sort of resonance. It provokes an irritation so intense that for hours afterwards any low-pitched sound seems to echo through one's body." (*Sunday Times,* 16 April 1967)

German experiments with certain inaudible low frequencies produced nausea, fright, and panic, and Professor Gavreau wonders whether many of the nervous conditions associated with city life may not be due to unheard infra-sounds generated by heavy machinery, air-conditioning, and similar sources. Southampton University Institute of Sound and Vibration is concerned also about the hazards, in our mechanized age, of increased continuous exposure to infra-sounds, however weak.

The power of "Sound" was recognized in ancient times. Various world scriptures speak of the universe as created by "Sound," the "Word," or vibration. Ancient temples and physicians used music for healing. Whether used for creation or destruction "sound" is still the same force. Asclepiades is said to have used a trumpet to vibrate away the pain of sciatica. The flute and harmonica have been used to cure other diseases. The need for research into the biological effects of sound is recognized today, yet there appears to be — apart from the valuable, but empiric, music-therapy in hospitals, etc. — no current research into the creative, restorative power of sound. Perhaps that comes too near to "Occultism," a subject still suspect by orthodoxy but which can

offer information about the rationale and warnings against the hazards of misuse.

> We say and maintain that SOUND, for one thing, is a tremendous Occult power; that it is a stupendous force, of which the electricity generated by a million of Niagaras could never counteract the smallest potentiality when directed with *occult knowledge*. Sound may be produced of such a nature that the pyramid of Cheops would be lifted in the air, or that a dying man, nay, one at his last breath, would be revived and filled with new energy and vigour.
>
> For Sound generates, or rather attracts together, the elements that produce an *ozone*, the fabrication of which is beyond chemistry, but within the limits of Alchemy. ... *As one saved thrice from death* by that power, the writer ought to be credited with knowing personally something about it. (H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Secret Doctrine,* I.555)

In November 1965 mention was made in these pages of an article by the eminent economist, Dr. E. F. Schumacher (*The Observer*, 29 August 1965), in which he made the plea that foreign aid given to the developing countries should be of a kind suited to their needs. What was really needed was not the highly sophisticated, capital-intensive technology, but an "intermediate technology," making full use of the labour so readily available, and using relatively simple production methods, that do not demand skilled maintenance of machines. The comment ended with the hope that Dr. Schumacher's humane and practical suggestions would be soon implemented.

Now the Intermediate Technology Development Group in Britain has brought out a buyers' guide, *Tools for Progress* (*The Observer,* 17 December 1967), intended for the peasant peoples of the developing countries. The type of equipment that it lists for export would be considered antiquated by industrialists — hand-operated looms for mats, animal-drawn tool bars, pedal pumps, two-wheel carts, and so on — but its cheapness and suitability means that such equipment can be of very real value to the populations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, since it gives opportunity for self-help at home, instead of producing — as does the more highly technological aid — an unhealthy imbalance between the masses and the sophisticated developed sector, with its concomitants of excessive urban growth and unemployment.

During the early winter of 1967-8 Britain suffered a terrible epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease among farm livestock. It has cost the Government (*The Guardian,* 18 January 1968) nearly £4,000,000 for vaccine and other expenses, and about £26,000,000 in compensation for the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of animals in the attempt to stop the spread of infection. Yet the Ministry of Agriculture has turned a cold eye upon the demand by over a hundred farmers in Cheshire for an enquiry into the protective results claimed by them for inexpensive and simple treatment with homoeopathic borax (*Daily Mail,* 18 December 1967). Homoeopathy uses, not animal vivisection, but human volunteers as "provers" for its drugs. The "essence" of the drugs (the greater the homoeopathic dilution, the higher the potency) is employed on the principle of "like cures like." Crude borax produces the same symptoms as foot-and-mouth disease. Official veterinary sources assert that *their* previous researches into homoeopathy have found no value in it. Yet if the Cheshire farmers' herds remain in the clear, this will carry more weight with practical men than official pronouncements.

A comment by Geoffrey L. Rudd (*British Vegetarian*, January-February 1968) is also pertinent. He refers to Newman Turner, one of the foremost champions of natural farming, who held that the policy of wholesale slaughter would actually encourage the incidence of foot-and-mouth diseases. He proved

that *natural* immunity, from organically grown food, gives protection, even when animals are in actual contact with diseased ones. He considered the disease a form of bovine influenza, from which animals can recover with right feeding, since malnutrition plays a part in their susceptibility to it. Sir Albert Howard, who introduced organic husbandry into India, also prohibited inoculations for his cattle, who displayed a sturdy resistance to the various killer-epidemics.

Organic farming, instead of trying to bend aside natural laws for enhanced commercial profits, works with nature, proving both practical and compassionate. "Compassionate" should not be equated with "sentimental."

We may note with sympathy, therefore (*British Vegetarian,* January-February 1968) the formation of a new trust, "Compassion in World Farming" (CIWF), with the purpose of counteracting and opposing ruthlessness, whether towards animal or plant life, or even the soil itself. It will range itself against the exploitation of the land, and the destruction of the variety that makes up the healthy balance (and the beauty) of nature. It plans to inaugurate an international campaign against the battery-system for poultry and the similarly unnatural intensive methods for calves and pigs. It will endeavour to show the fallacy of the idea that such increased production is "progress," and it will point to the ruthlessness that stockpiles food while so many countries go short. The International Society for the Protection of Animals is acting with CIWF in the demand for the abolition of the battery-system. A News Letter is being published, the Hon. Secretary being P. H. Roberts, Copse House, Greatham, Liss, Hampshire, England. All success to their efforts!

From Harmony, from heavenly Harmony
This universal frame began:
When Nature underneath a heap
Of jarring atoms lay
And could not heave her head,
The tuneful voice was heard from high
Arise, ye more than dead!
Then cold, and hot, and moist, and dry
In order to their stations leap,
And Music's power obey.
From harmony, from heavenly harmony
This universal frame began:
From harmony to harmony
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in Man.

* * * * *

So when the last and dreadful hour
This crumbling pageant shall devour
The trumpet shall be heard on high,
The dead shall live, the living die,
And Music shall untune the sky.

JOHN DRYDEN: "Song for St. Cecilia's Day, 1687"

Statement about ownership and other particulars about the magazine "THE ARYAN PATH" to be published in the first issue every year after the last day of February

---

FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

1.	Place of Publication :	1 B. P. Wadia Road Bangalore 4 (India)
2.	Periodicity of its publication :	Monthly, 1st of the Month
3.	Printer's Name : Nationality : Address :	L. S. Doraiswamy Indian 29 Sir Krishna Rao Road Bangalore 4
4.	Publisher's Name : Nationality : Address :	L. S. Doraiswamy Indian 29 Sir Krishna Rao Road Bangalore 4 *Simultaneously published by* : K. R. Achutha Rao "Theosophy Hall" 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 1
5.	Editor's Name : Nationality : Address :	Sophia Wadia Indian "Theosophy Hall" 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 1
6.	Names and addresses of individuals who own the newspaper and partners or shareholders holding more than one per cent of the total capital.	Theosophy Co. (India) Private Ltd. 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 1 (A Charitable Company)

I. L. S. Doraiswamy, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(*Sd.*) L. S. DORAISWAMY
Publisher

Date 1st March 1968